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INFORMING RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY THROUGH CASE STUDIES OF LOSS-AVERSION 
 
The problem this thesis addresses is that there are two disparate general notions 
of a ‘rational decision’ and neither notion is satisfactory as the basis for a rational choice 
theory that can improve our lives by improving our decision-making.  One is too strict, 
labeling too many decisions irrational, while the other is too permissive, allowing 
decisions to be called rational when they should not be.  I attempt to outline a better 
version of rationality, which I call global rationality, by examining the problems with the 
common notions in the context of a discussion of the well-documented phenomenon of 
loss-aversion in decision-making.  While looking at case studies of loss-aversion, I argue 
for two main distinguishing features of my global rationality:  it should respect an 
internalist view so that the rigid requirements of the standard rational choice theory will 
often not apply (while maintaining limits regarding which consistency requirements can 
be disregarded), and it should respect emotional utilities—the negative or positive 
emotions that accompany a decision should factor into the utility calculus (with 
important qualifications).  I conclude with suggestions as to how the skeletal global 
rationality I’ve outlined can be filled-out in the future, in the process also offering some 
insights into the dynamic nature of rationality itself. 
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The concept of rationality is central in any discussion of good decision-making.  It 
is held up as the standard for which we should strive:  the more we make our decisions 
in conformity with it, the better our decision-making will be, and the better our lives will 
go, says the conventional wisdom.  As often as rationality is talked and written about, as 
widely recognized as its importance is, however, I think we know surprisingly little about 
it.  In this thesis I look at case studies in order to examine problems with our current 
understanding of rationality, and to attempt to get a better understanding of exactly 
what the standard for our decision-making that we call ‘rationality’ is, and exactly how 
we should view it. 
In Chapter One I detail what I take to be the most common notions of rationality 
today.  I first consider the formalized version of rationality in standard rational choice 
theory.  I suggest that the problem with this notion is that, due to its specialization for 
use in theory, by its standards too many decisions are held to be irrational when our 
intuitions tell us they are not.  The reaction to this formal version of rationality is a more 
intuitive version, then, that is more permissive, allowing decisions to be rational even 
though they may be wrong.  I suggest that a sensible place to start our global rationality 
is more in line with this latter, intuitive notion, but also warn that this notion will run 
into problems as well.  In this process I also attempt to explain deeper philosophical 
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issues that are running beneath the two opposing notions of rationality.  I look at the 
internal-external reasons debate, and draw connections between the sides of that 
debate and the sides of our debate over rationality.  I suggest there are parallels 
between the way the internal-external reasons debate is often navigated in philosophy, 
and the way I plan to search for a more sensible and useful notion of rationality 
between the two existing notions.    
A set of case studies in loss-aversion is the medium I use to try to devise a global 
rationality.  At the close of Chapter One I explain exactly what is loss-aversion—this 
phenomenon that potential losses looming larger than potential gains of equal 
magnitude leads people into what, on standard rational choice theory’s view, are clearly 
irrational decisions.  In Chapter Two I begin looking at specific, well-documented 
instances of loss-aversion.  The main point of these case studies is to suggest that a 
move away from the standard rational choice theory’s rationality to a more intuitive one 
is justified.  More specifically, this intuitive notion is one that is more sensitive to the 
idea that rationality should be an internal question, asking only whether one is moving 
towards ends that she has internalized.  The intuitive notion also more readily than its 
counterpart admits of what I call emotional utilities—positive and negative emotional 
responses that accompany decisions—as real factors that should be included in any 
utility calculus.   
These internalist moves, as I call them, can be taken too far, and the intuitive 
notion lacks the structure necessary to prevent them from being taken too far.  This is 
why I also impose what I call externalist checks throughout the discussion.  To the first 
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internalist move that says that internal reasons should be the sole concern of 
rationality, I impose the externalist check that outlaws some supposed ‘ends,’ 
specifically ones that directly contradict the basic tenets of what it means to be rational, 
from being adopted by any thinking, judging being.  I open the final chapter by imposing 
another important externalist check to the internalist move of admitting emotional 
utility when I argue that some emotional utilities can be shown to be illegitimate, and 
leading to irrational decisions, if they are causes for a loss-averse reaction without also 
being a reason for that reaction.  
With these internalist moves and externalist checks complete, I offer my final 
version of global rationality—an outlined version that I admit is bare, but is at least 
justified by the work in the case studies preceding.  I suggest ways in which this global 
rationality can be further filled-out, both in substance through empirical studies, and in 
theory through more philosophy.  I close by reflecting on the dynamic nature of 
rationality that my studies have helped to reveal.  In our endless quest to “be rational,” 
it should certainly help if we remove misconceptions about rationality, and better 
understand the true nature of this goal for which we strive. 
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CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS A RATIONAL DECISION? 
 
 In this first chapter I intend to identify and explain the problem to which I hope 
to pose a solution with my thesis:  the differing conceptions of rationality related to 
decision, and the confusion that such a difference causes about rationality as it relates 
to human nature.  I will lay out the different conceptions of what a rational decision is, 
as well as offer what I plan to use as working definitions in my study.  I will introduce the 
internal-external reasons debate, which will be relevant to the discussion throughout 
this thesis.  Finally, I will introduce the phenomenon of loss-aversion, which will be the 
central issue in our three case studies.   
§1. Rationality in Rational Choice Theory 
 Rational choice theory, a theory most often used in economics, holds that a 
rational decision is one that maximizes utility.  This is simply a formalized version of the 
intuitive notion that given a set of options, the rational decision-maker will choose the 
one that will produce the best outcome.  Utility is an intentionally loose term, but most 
often it is equated with ‘good.’  A unit of utility (a utile1) is a unit of some good, so the 
                                                             
1 Martin Hollis uses this term in The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1987) to 
refer to individual units of utility.  He traces the term to “the old Benthamite felicific calculus” (p. 17), but 
since I have not encountered the word frequently in contemporary writings on rational choice, I credit 
Hollis for resurrecting this useful term. 
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goal of the rational decision-maker, according to the rational choice theorist, is to make 
decisions that bring her as many utiles as possible.   
 Decision theory, a field closely related to rational choice theory, seeks to define 
rational decisions in contexts of uncertainty.  For this purpose it has the concept of 
expected utility, which is derived by multiplying the utility associated with a certain 
outcome by the probability of that outcome occurring.  Decision theory’s rational 
decision-maker, then, is one who maximizes expected utility.  When decision theory is 
viewed as a branch of philosophy, its probability-utility model easily translates into the 
belief-desire model of action more common in philosophy.  As decision theory’s rational 
decider is one whose goal in deciding is to maximize expected utility by considering the 
utility of a potential outcome in proportion to the probability that the outcome will 
obtain, in philosophy a rational actor is one whose goal in acting is to bring about the 
maximum good by considering the desirability of a possible outcome (analogous to 
utility) along with her belief that a certain action will cause the outcome to obtain 
(analogous to probability).   
 Thus decision theory has deep philosophical roots, and one can find traces of 
decision theory throughout the history of philosophy.  Andre Archie has done a study of 
instances of decision theory in Platonic dialogues.  One such example is when Socrates, 
seeking to determine the potential of Alcibiades as a political leader, poses hypothetical 
decisions to him.  Socrates realizes that, with belief and desire interacting as they do, if 
he wants to get to the bottom of Alcibiades’ beliefs and ambitions, he must strategically 
ask many questions.  As Socrates poses various hypothetical decisions, sometimes 
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holding the probability (or level of belief) of two options constant so that he can 
determine how Alcibiades assigns utility (or the makeup of his desires), Archie sees a 
precursor to the contribution that F.P. Ramsey made to decision theory in the twentieth 
century.2 
 Even more explicit connections between philosophy and decision theory can be 
found in the modern era, from a time still long before any formal, so-called decision 
theory was advanced.  The following is a famous quotation from the final chapter of the 
Port-Royal Logic:   
In order to decide what we ought to do to obtain some good or avoid some 
harm, it is necessary to consider not only the good or harm in itself, but also the 
probability that it will or will not occur, and to view geometrically the proportion 
all these things have when taken together.3   
 
Daniel Bernoulli, in his New theory on the measurement of risk, made a key addendum 
to this basic operating principle when he pointed out that one’s circumstances 
(specifically his current wealth) will dictate whether or not a given risky decision is a 
good one—not the expected value of the outcome alone. 4   This too was an important 
contribution to decision theory long before decision theory was known as such, and is 
one I will later look at in greater detail.  
                                                             
2 Andre Archie, “Instances of Decision Theory in Plato’s Alcibiades Major and Minor and in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (2006): 368.  I don’t delve very deeply into this 
article here, but it is a useful piece for understanding the presence of the underpinnings of modern 
decision theory in ancient philosophy. 
3 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) 273-274. 
4 Daniel Bernoulli, Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk, trans. Louise Sommer 




  For all its roots in philosophy, however, the current understanding of rationality 
in rational choice theory is divorced from a philosophical understanding.  Many 
phenomena observed every day are held up as examples of irrational decisions.  One 
such example, as cited by Ori and Rom Brafman, is an overreaction to small price 
increases for eggs.  When the price of eggs increases just slightly, “shoppers completely 
overreact…cut(ting) back consumption by two and a half times.”5   
 To be able to take a real instance and analyze it in rational choice theory, 
however, certain assumptions must be made.  The most obvious one in the egg example 
is that consumers’ only end is to get the best bargain, or something like that.  Rational 
choice theorists do not deny their basic operating assumptions.  Still, we seldom see 
their conclusions worded, “Given our basic operating assumptions (like Joe Consumer 
being interested only in getting the most for his money), and using our specialized 
understanding of the term ‘rational decision,’ we can say that Joe Consumer is making 
an irrational decision.”  Instead, “Joe Consumer is irrational,” is the conclusion most 
often made.  Dan Ariely’s book Predictably Irrational treats examples like these.  
Although Ariely certainly understands the operating assumptions he is using6, and their 
sometimes questionable justification, one must wonder if his book would have made 
                                                             
5 Ori Brafman and Rom Brafman, Sway:  The Irresistible Pull of Irrational Behavior (New York: Doubleday, 
2008) 18. 
6 Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational:  The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York:  HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2008).  Ariely’s book is a fascinating read with many insights on human psychology and 
decision-making.  My point here is simply that Ariely is more focused on his examples than on his 
definition of irrationality.  He defines human irrationality as “our distance from perfection” (xix), and 
reflects no further on his choice of definition. 
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the impact that it has were it titled Predictably Irrational, Given Certain (Sometimes 
Shaky) Assumptions.  
One more example, not quite as current but certainly in the same spirit, comes 
from D.V. Lindley in Making Decisions.  The book purports to be a statistician’s guide to 
applying basic principles of decision theory in order to make better decisions.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, then, Lindley does not focus on the operating assumptions of decision 
theory acting as a limitation to its practical applicability.  Instead he takes decisions that 
appear to be irrational per decision theory as just that:  “(Many studies) mostly appear 
to show that man does not make decisions in accord with the recipes developed here:  
in other words, he is incoherent.”7   
In these examples it is obvious the authors are more concerned with examining 
interesting examples of when we defy the prescriptions of rational choice theory than 
with reflecting on the concept of rationality.  As our focus is to critically examine what 
should be called a rational decision, however, we need little time to familiarize 
ourselves with such supposed cases of irrationality before a natural objection should 
come to mind:  why should these decisions be called irrational when on the surface it is 
not clear the agent should have even known that the decision was wrong?  Isn’t it 
important to distinguish a mistaken decision from an irrational one?8  On the 
interpretation of many rational choice theorists, however, if it can be shown that Joe 
Consumer chose the option less advantageous, even if making such a determination 
                                                             
7 D.V. Lindley, Making Decisions (London: John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1971) 3. 
8 This may be the first objection that comes to mind, but it isn’t the only one.  That the decision might not 
be mistaken at all is another objection that, in various forms, will see significant treatment in this thesis. 
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would have been very difficult for Joe, then it is concluded that Joe made an irrational 
decision.  This is the point where it becomes obvious that the rational choice theorist’s 
conception of a rational decision is very different from our intuitive conception of a 
rational decision—there is a gap that concerns knowledge.   
Under the rational choice theorist’s conception, which I shall henceforth 
abbreviate as Re for ‘economic rationality,’ an irrational decision is such because it is a 
choice against maximum utility, regardless of whether the agent knows it.  Under the 
intuitive notion of rationality Ri, however, a decision is irrational only if it is a choice 
against what the agent considers best.  One clear difference, then, between the two 
notions is the target in a rational decision:  for Re the target is maximum utility, for Ri the 
target is what the agent considers best.  The difference between ‘maximum utility’ and 
‘what’s best’ is the springboard for many a debate (some would argue, for example, that 
there is no difference), but it is a distraction for us here.  The difference I want to 
highlight, the one that attests to the epistemic gap, is that maximum utility is 
independent of what the agent knows, while “what the agent considers best” has agent 
awareness built-in.  In other words irrationality under Ri carries with it the crucial 
feature of deciding what, at some level, you know you should not.  It resembles what 
Aristotle called akrasia, or what Locke expressed when he quoted Ovid: “I see and 
esteem the better; I follow the worse.”9  
The difference between Re and Ri has more subtleties, as has already been 
suggested, but the difference highlighted above is already sufficient to attest to a 
                                                             




disconcerting gap between the two conceptions.  These two conceptions are at play in 
what is sometimes called the prescriptive-descriptive gap in decision theory:  the oft-
observed fact that people’s actual decision-making often deviates from the 
prescriptions of rational choice theory.  The prescriptions of rational choice theory 
assume Re, while when we deviate from such prescriptions we don’t believe we are 
irrational—rather, we hold that while we might be wrong,10 we can still be rational 
under Ri. 
Many might not agree with my assessment of this gap as disconcerting, however.  
The gap, as I have presented it, is not a problem that many have appeared troubled by.  
I surmise that they take the situation as it is and move on—the term ‘rational decision’ 
is being used in two very different senses:  one highly technical, one intuitive and more 
general.  Perhaps these two different uses of the same term are reconcilable, perhaps 
they are not.  That not many attempts have been made implies that few have viewed a 
reconciliation project to be worth the effort.   
Obviously I do not share that view.  I have already expressed my concern above, 
albeit briefly, over the confusion that the different uses of the same term can cause—a 
confusion which I believe invites mistaken general conclusions about the nature of 
rationality in humanity.  Any human being, and especially philosophers who concern 
themselves with exact definitions and human nature, should take pause when such 
conclusions are drawn.  This thesis is the expression of my belief that a reconciliation 
project is worthwhile.  Rather than leave the two disparate conceptions alone, I want to 
                                                             
10 As was mentioned above, whether we are wrong will also be up for debate. 
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devise a global conception of rationality,11 Rg, which can encompass the truth about 
rationality that both conceptions hold.  Not every aspect of either conception will be 
admissible into Rg—some things will need to be trimmed.  The goal is that an accurate 
global understanding of rationality will emerge from the process, and that this Rg will 
support a better-informed normative notion of rationality, one more applicable to our 
daily lives12.   
While I find it curious that attempts like this have not been more common, I do 
not take that as a warning sign of impending failure.  Great minds have tackled 
questions that are relevant (albeit obliquely) to my goal.  In particular, I will draw on the 
work of Donald Davidson often for help in solving puzzles I confront.  Davidson wrote 
extensively on rationality, and did sometimes consider the juxtaposition of different 
senses of rationality.  He did not address the issue by starting with the problem that I 
have, however, so there is some work for me to apply Davidson’s thoughts to my 
specific question of how to devise Rg so that it can make rational choice theory work 
more closely with our intuitions.  Where I end up with Rg will also bear some important 
differences from what Davidson says about rationality.  But, while I will end in what I 
think is a novel position, at least my journey there will not be entirely solitary. 
                                                             
11 ‘Global rationality’ is not a new term that I’ve invented.  Robert Audi refers to it in The Architecture of 
Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) as the overall rationality that encompasses practical 
rationality and theoretical rationality, for example (195).  I do think, however, that what I intend for the 
term to mean in this study is unique.   
12 It is crucial to bear in mind that a rationality with sufficient normativity to support rational choice 
theory is the goal of this study.  I may sometimes make statements that some notion of rationality is 
inadequate or of no use.  I do not mean this in an absolute sense; I mean that it is inadequate for us, given 
the goal of this study. 
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§2. Intuitive Rationality and the Beginnings of Global Rationality 
 I have said a few things about the intuitive notion of rationality, Ri, that draws a 
contrast to Re, but more needs to be said about it.  First I should address possible 
concerns over my choice to call this competing conception “intuitive.”  If I have clearly 
explained that I hope to expound an Rg superior to Re and Ri, a perceptive reader might 
wonder if I don’t plan to appeal to intuition when I am arguing away from not only Re, 
but also from Ri, and of course it would be strange to appeal to our intuitions about 
rationality in order to show why Ri is wrong.   
It is correct that I plan to appeal to intuition, but that is not all I will appeal to.  I 
take Ri to be a rather superficial understanding of rationality that a quick intuition on 
the subject can yield.  I don’t take it to be the product of intuitions about rationality 
interacting with careful philosophical reflections on the concept, and this is what I hope 
for Rg to be (so that it can be more intuitive without losing the normativity I see as 
essential).  More specifically, with Ri I have two basic ideas in mind.  The first is the 
simple observation that there should be a distinction between a wrong decision and an 
irrational one, as was explained in making the epistemic point above.  The second is that 
if we make the intuitive move of taking “rational decision” literally, we can understand it 
simply as a decision made for a reason.  Hopefully in time I can show how this intuitive 
understanding can easily go awry. 
Having clearly declared my intent to end with Rg significantly different from Ri, I 
think I can now safely begin a sketch of Rg with a trademark of Ri—the distinction 
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between a rational and right decision.  Martin Peterson views this as an important 
distinction to make in introducing his readers to decision theory, for he writes: 
“A decision is right if and only if its actual outcome is at least as good as that of 
every other possible outcome.” 
“A decision is rational if and only if the decision maker chooses to do what she 
has most reason to do at the point in time at which the decision is made.”13   
I take making this distinction as a nod to Ri, for reasons explained above.  If this 
distinction does exist in Re, or what Peterson later calls “being rational in the classical 
sense,”14 it might be something like a distinction between excusable irrationality and 
irrationality where one clearly should have known better.  In any case it does not play an 
important role in Re.   
I will not take Peterson’s definitions and use them for Rg without first discussing 
some important issues and making modifications.  The first is an assumption I plan to 
make which I should put off discussing no longer:  that rational and irrational decisions 
(and right and wrong decisions) are complementary sets.  As my case studies on loss-
aversion will confirm, I am often more interested in studying irrational and wrong 
decisions than rational and right.  However, defining rational and right decisions, and 
letting irrational and wrong decisions follow as their complements, seems the clearest 
way to proceed.  In most contexts it is an assumption one should not make.  As 
Davidson points out, “The irrational is not merely the non-rational, which lies outside 
                                                             
13 Martin Peterson, An Introduction to Decision Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 5. 
14 Peterson 295. 
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the ambit of the rational; irrationality is a failure within the house of reason.”15  By 
calling irrational the complement of rational, I might technically be including under 
irrational some things that have no business being there.  However, I will try to frame all 
of the discussions of examples so that the assumption is reasonable and harmless. 
Turning attention to the definitions themselves, one should notice that a right 
decision depends heavily on the goodness of the outcomes.  “Good” here is a highly 
subjective entity, and measuring goodness (or, assigning utility) is far from an exact 
science.  Even basic versions of decision theory make no secret of this; still it is 
important that we note that our definition of a right decision is in no way immune to 
this complication.  Also, our definition of right depends on the utility of every other 
possible (but not actualized) outcome.  Therefore to know with certainty that a decision 
is right we need not just a complete knowledge of the agent’s current subjective utilities 
(which, in reality even the agent herself probably won’t have), but a complete 
knowledge of the agent’s subjective utilities for every other possible outcome.  Calling a 
decision right will at best be an approximation. 
Peterson makes no attempt to specify what is to be held as “good,” in his 
definition of a right decision, and his definition of a rational decision is even vaguer.  He 
must know full well the consequences of getting any more specific with his definitions, 
and as his goal is to make this distinction and move on, one could say he does an 
admirable job in making this distinction in a noncommittal way.  Since our task is 
precisely what Peterson hoped to avoid, however, we should consider the next instance 
                                                             
15 Donald Davidson, “Paradoxes of Irrationality,” Problems of Rationality, ed. Davidson (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2004) 169. 
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of fuzziness.  The vagueness of his rational decision definition begets two major 
questions, both coming from the phrase “what she has most reason to do.”  
The first question is whether “what she has most reason to do,” as far as she 
knows is the implied meaning here.  I think it is, for otherwise any wrong decision could 
become an irrational decision, and the distinction that we care about, and that I believe 
is motivating Peterson here, collapses.  Thus it appears that this is one point on which 
Peterson could have afforded to be more specific, for it is already implied by the fact 
that he is making such a distinction.  The second question is one, however, that could 
have launched Peterson into the internal versus external reasons debate, as it will now 
do to us. 
§3. Internalism versus Externalism 
The second question that “what she has most reason to do” begets is,  
“Given what ends?” Is it, given the ends she has chosen?  That some end must be 
involved in order to even speak of rational decisions is an uncontroversial assumption 
supported by most reflections on the concept of rationality.  Whether the end is purely 
a matter of the agent’s choosing, however, or is something else (an objective standard 
of ‘the good life,’ for example) is a much thornier issue—one that often takes form of 
the internal versus external reasons debate.   
I should caution the reader that an “internalism-externalism debate” can take on 
very different forms in philosophy.  For example, in one sense this applies to the 
relationship between reasons and desires, and what motivates an agent.  In this context 
the internalist is one who believes that a reason alone can motivate an agent to do 
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some action a—the motivation comes internal to the reason.  The externalist, by 
contrast, holds that a reason alone cannot motivate an agent to do a—it must be 
accompanied by a desire to do a.  The motivation is external to the reason, then; it is 
contained in the desire.  The internalist side here is often liked to Kant, while the 
externalist side is linked to Hume. 
There is a different kind of internalism-externalism debate, however:  one that 
concerns the question of what justifies an agent rather than what motivates her.  In this 
context both sides maintain the very general view that an agent’s decision is justified 
(and therefore rational) if the agent has a reason for the decision.  The key difference is 
that the internalist holds that the agent must be aware of that reason, in some sense,16  
in order to have it at all, while the externalist does not.  The externalist holds that a 
decision can be rational even if it serves an end (or, equivalently, is for a reason) that 
the agent is unaware of, and conversely, that a decision is irrational if it goes against an 
end the agent has but isn’t aware of.  
It should be made clear that the latter is the internalism-externalism debate that 
concerns this study.  The question I posed that launched us into internalism versus 
externalism was whether the ends of the agent must be known and chosen by the agent 
in order to require that the agent act towards those ends.  Another way to phrase this 
would be to ask whether the ends must have been internalized by the agent.  The 
internalist is defined by the fact that he answers yes, the externalist by the fact that he 
answers no.  The opposing sides of this debate align with the opposing notions of 
                                                             
16 This “in some sense” introduces quite a bit of leeway for the internalist. 
17 
 
rationality that I have already detailed.  Re seems to share the philosophy of the 
externalist here, for the economic understanding is not concerned with what exactly the 
agent knows regarding how his actions lead to his ends.  Additionally, it is not overly 
concerned with which ends the agent has adopted and prioritized; regardless of those 
choices there are certain external ends he should also pursue.  Re certainly affirms 
external standards of rationality.  Ri aligns with the internalist here, for the internalist in 
this debate appears to be making the same claim as the intuitionist that ‘rational 
decision’ should be understood literally, thus the question of rationality should be 
strictly an instrumental one.  It is only given certain ends, springing from internal 
desires, that decisions are rational or irrational.  Those ends themselves are not properly 
evaluated by rationality.   
In light of this alignment, it is natural that I expand Re to mean, roughly, 
economic/external rationality, and Ri to mean, roughly, intuitive/internal rationality 
(thus exploiting the happy coincidence that my chosen subscripts already apply).  I offer 
one caveat, however, that the paired notions should not be understood as identical.  For 
example, an internalist can modify his picture so that in some respects it looks more like 
economic rationality than intuitive rationality, while remaining internalist at heart.  As 
long as the fluid nature of these concepts is borne in mind, however, I promote the 
pairing I have described, and will use it henceforth. 
I also should clarify that henceforth when I refer to internalism and externalism, I 
will always be using those terms in the context of the second internalism-externalism 
debate I have just detailed.  Incidentally, I think much confusion could be avoided if the 
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first debate were referred to exclusively as “internal versus external motivation,” and 
the second one exclusively as “internal versus external reasons.”  In practice, however, 
the second name is common but the first is not, and the topics often lapse into the 
confusing “internalism versus externalism” label.17 
A good example of this confusion is comes in a chapter from Martin Hollis titled 
“External and Internal Reasons.”  From the chapter’s title we could infer that Hollis is 
interested in the same question about justification that we are, and he is, yet he seems 
to jumble this with the question of motivation.  He sets up a debate between himself 
and Bernard Williams in which Hollis will be the externalist, arguing specifically that a 
person can have reasons for action that are not in his immediate, current set of desires, 
and Williams is the internalist taking the opposing side.  The confusion enters when he 
follows Williams’ lead, Williams having dubbed his views “Sub-Humean,” by calling his 
own views “Sub-Kantian.”18  This suggests that Kant is an externalist with Hollis while 
Hume is an internalist with Williams, even though, as I have explained, on the question 
of motivation Kant is the paradigm internalist while Hume is the paradigm externalist.  
Hollis could have dispelled much confusion by pointing out that whether we are 
considering motivation or justification makes all the difference:  in the internal-external 
motivation debate Hume is the internalist and Kant is the externalist, while in the 
internal-external reasons debate the opposite holds.  In fact, I believe Hollis’ crucial, yet 
not well-explained premise is this:  Hume being an externalist about motivation leads 
                                                             
17 And this is exactly what I will do in the rest of this thesis, but at least I have clarified my intentions here. 
18 Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason 74-77. 
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him to be an internalist about reasons and Kant’s internalism about motivation leads 
him to be an externalist about reasons. 
Despite the inherent confusion in the internalism-externalism debate, 
manifested in Hollis’ discussion, I believe the debate, and Hollis’ discussion, are worth 
keeping around in this study.  As I have already explained how the sides in the debate 
align nicely with Re and Ri, it should come as no surprise that the style of the debate will 
also mirror the exchange I am planning between Re and Ri.  Specifically, for each side in 
the internalism-externalism debate there are some test cases in which the other side 
more closely resembles a sensible picture of rationality, while its own side is forced into 
uncomfortable positions.  The goal of each side is to recognize the more attractive 
features of the opposite side in these cases, and try to account for those features in its 
own side’s terms.  Despite the aforementioned unclear aspects of Hollis’ discussion, it is 
a good model of this process, as he focuses on problem cases that make the internalist’s 
notion of rationality look untenable.  He considers the way Williams responds to these 
problems for the internalist, and while he evidently holds Williams’ internalist attempts 
in high regard, he concludes that Williams cannot resolve the problem on internalist 
grounds without “giv(ing) the game to the external reasons theorist.”19  Thus I will 
allude to this debate and Hollis’ discussion of it at times in this study.   
 At the very least, I hope that this dive into internal-external reasons has shown 
the depth of the philosophical issues beneath the answer to whether the agent’s ends 
                                                             
19 Hollis 86. 
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must be ends she has chosen.  How we answer that question will determine the 
orientation of our initial Rg—whether it leans more towards Re or Ri. 
§4. Rg:  The First Version 
Without further ado, I offer my modified definitions of rational and right 
decisions, having taken a side on the internal-external reasons debate: 
A decision is right if and only if its actual outcome is at least as good as that of 
every other possible outcome. 
A decision is rational if and only if the decision maker, given ends she has 
internalized and knows, chooses to do what, as far as she knows, she has most 
reason to do at the point in time at which the decision is made. 
As is evident from the rational decision definition, I have taken the side of internalism.  
My reasoning for this does not reflect a knock-down argument against externalism—
rather I take it merely as a logical consequence of my commitment to a knowledge 
requirement (“as far as she knows”) in our definitions.  Since I am asserting that an 
irrational decision needs to involve knowledge, at least to a small degree, that the 
decision is wrong, it would be strange if I were to then take the externalist side and 
claim that the agent need not have chosen her ends, or even be aware of them.  It 
would yield something like “what she has most reason to do, as far as she knows, in 
accord with ends which may or may not be of her choosing, or even of her knowledge.” 
If one can have most reason to do x because doing x best satisfies y, y being some end 
the agent has no knowledge of, it makes no sense to specify that x best satisfies y, as far 
as the agent knows.   
Above I mentioned that it appeared Peterson could have been more specific and 
included the knowledge requirement in his definition of a rational decision.  Now that I 
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have argued that an internalist commitment is a logical consequence of including such a 
requirement, however, it should be clear why Peterson did not, at least if his goal was to 
avoid taking a side.  Recalling that the knowledge requirement is a sensible (if not 
logical) consequence of making the distinction between right and rational to begin with, 
however, I believe Peterson to be more committed to internalism than perhaps he 
realizes.  In any case, I make no secret of my current internalist commitments, and it is 
fair to say that the above definitions, my working definitions for Rg, currently lean 
towards Ri.  In fact, one might argue it just is Ri, as was Peterson’s—the only difference 
with mine being that a few consequences are drawn out.  Again, I readily admit that Rg 
as it currently stands seems to have clearly taken the side of Ri over Re.  Once our case 
studies in loss-aversion begin, however, the need to draw important differences 
between Rg and Ri should become clear. 
§5. What is Loss-Aversion? 
 Now that Re and Ri, have been established, and background on the internal-
external reasons debate has been covered, we have many of the tools we will use in our 
search for a better definition of Rg.  As the search will center on studies of loss-aversion, 
it is also necessary to get familiar with that concept.  The term, coined by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, can be explained most simply by stating that “losses loom 
larger than corresponding gains.”20  Stated another way, in making a decision, a 
potential loss of x utiles has greater weight than a potential gain of x utiles.  A simple 
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example is the choice between a 50% chance to win $1000 (with a 50% chance to win 
nothing), and a sure gain of $450.  Although the expected utility of the first option 
($500—we make a simplifying assumption and put utility in dollars here) is greater than 
the second, studies show that many will pick the second option.  Loss-aversion is said to 
be responsible for this deviation from decision theory’s prescription, for people view the 
$450 as a potential loss if they were to take the gamble and get nothing.  This looms 
larger than the potential gain of $1000 (expected utility $500) in the gamble, so they 
choose the sure thing.  
 Risky contexts, like the one above, are often conducive to loss-averse decisions. 
Daniel Bernoulli’s 1738 work on risk is widely recognized as a great advancement in the 
prehistory of decision theory, and not surprisingly it also contains important insights on 
loss-aversion.  In it he starts with a simple observation that in risky contexts, people 
often behave contrary to the dictates of a simple expected utility calculus.  Specifically, 
he notes that people are often unwilling to take a “fair gamble:” a fifty-fifty chance of 
winning or losing x dollars.  He intuits the reason to be that the negative utility of the 
loss of $x is greater than the positive utility of a gain of $x.  Though not stated in exactly 
the same way, this idea present in Bernoulli’s work is a precursor to loss-aversion as 
Kahneman and Tversky would later define it.   
 Bernoulli’s most interesting contribution is that he did not stop at simply an 
intuition of this, however.  He devised mathematical expressions that newly defined 
which gambles are rational and irrational.  As an example, take one of Bernoulli’s 
simpler expressions:  (L*G).5, where L is the agent’s total wealth if he loses the gamble 
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and G is his total wealth if he wins.  This particular expression applies only to fair 
gambles, but a more general form of the expression is also available for other gambles.  
If the expression yields an amount greater than the agent’s current wealth, the rational 
decision is to take the gamble; and taking the gamble would be irrational if the 
expression yields a total wealth that is less than the agent’s current wealth.21  The 
expression is shown in action with a few examples below: 




















1 100000 10 20 10 0 100010 99990 99999.9995 
2 200 50 101 50.5 0.5 251 150 194.0360791 
3 200 75 180 90 15 305 125 195.2562419 
4 200 75 200 100 25 325 125 201.5564437 
 
 Example 1 demonstrates Bernoulli’s assertion, “Everyone who bets any part of 
his fortune, however small, on a mathematically fair game of chance acts irrationally.”22  
Our example takes the form of paying $x for a lottery ticket that has a .5 chance of 
winning $2x, but this is simply an equivalent formulation of the mathematically fair 
game of chance.  Example 1 confirms mathematically the intuition of loss-aversion, for 
                                                             
21 Bernoulli 29. 
22 Bernoulli 29. 
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expected utility (zero in this example) tells us we should be indifferent, but Bernoulli’s 
expression, which accounts for loss-aversion, tells us we should not take the gamble23.   
 Examples 2 and 3 further demonstrate how Bernoulli’s expression attests to loss-
aversion—for by the standard utility calculus these are gambles it is rational to take, yet 
in both examples the last column shows a decrease from current wealth.  This suggests 
that, despite the positive net expected value, it is irrational to take these gambles.  
Finally, Example 4 is a case where both the standard expected utility calculus and 
Bernoulli’s expression dictate that the gamble be taken.  With the last three examples 
one can get a sense of how Bernoulli has precisely defined the phenomenon of loss-
aversion.  The threshold is clear-cut:  there are some gambles that look rational on the 
standard utility calculus, yet Bernoulli’s expression confirms our intuition that we should 
not take these gambles.  Other gambles, like Example 4, have higher expected utility, 
and while the certain amount of loss-aversion should mitigate their attractiveness, in 
the end they are still gambles we should take.   
 Certainly doubts will linger about how accurate Bernoulli’s expression really is as 
a descriptive theory.  It is hard to deny, however, that in these risky cases it is a better 
descriptive theory than the standard utility calculus.  Thus it is a good example of how 
the expected utility calculus can be improved into a better descriptive theory without 
yielding to any mysterious, unquantifiable factors (such as emotion, some might say). 
                                                             
23 In the present discussion, when I state that is ‘rational’ to take the gamble, or that we ‘should’ take it, 
this is operating on a simplifying assumption that increase in total wealth is our only end to consider. 
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 For all its merits, Bernoulli’s expression still faces the danger of running together 
the ideas of risk-aversion and loss-aversion.  When Kahneman and Tversky presented 
Prospect Theory over two centuries later, the difference was finally drawn out.  The 
difference can be best summarized by their key point that loss-aversion can cause 
people to be risk-seeking just as easily as it can cause people to be risk-averse.  The 
following example demonstrates this point: 
Choice 1:  Choose between  a) a sure gain of $3000 or      
    b) a gain of $4000 with probability .8 
Choice 2:  Choose between  c) a sure loss of $3000 or 
    d) a loss of $4000 with probability .8 
 
For Choice 1, the majority of respondents (80%) chose a), even though b) has a higher 
expected utility of $3200, thus displaying risk-averse behavior.  Loss-aversion seems 
responsible for this risk-aversion, since people want to avoid the feeling of loss that 
would come with passing up $3000 and possibly ending up with nothing.  For Choice 2, 
however, 92% of respondents chose d), even though c) has a higher expected utility (-
$3000, over option d)’s -$3200).  In Choice 2, a loss is almost inevitable, but people will 
risk paying more by choosing d) for the .2 probability that they will end up losing 
nothing.  This time loss-aversion has caused people to be risk-seeking.24  Thus, an 
important point that Prospect Theory makes evident is that risk-aversion is bidirectional, 
one might say, while loss-aversion is unidirectional.  While there is an observed 
phenomenon of risk-seeking behavior, there is no analogue of loss-seeking behavior.  All 
                                                             
24 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Choices, 
Values, and Frames, ed. Kahneman and Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 22-23. 
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this might suggest that loss-aversion is more fundamental than risk-aversion, but such a 
point is not important for our study. 
 What is important for our study is that we have a precise understanding of what 
loss-aversion is so that we can move forward with case studies in loss-aversion.  Using 
what we know about it, along with our background on Re and Ri, we can move towards a 
better grasp on Rg. 
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CHAPTER 2: INTERNALIST MOVES 
 
 In Chapter One the framework for our discussion of rationality was laid out, with 
two competing notions, Re and Ri, given to consider, along with the name for a target 
global conception, Rg.  We also looked at the internal-external reasons debate, and I 
suggested that important parallels might exist between that debate and our discussion 
of Re and Ri, which might help direct the latter discussion.  Finally, I introduced the 
phenomenon of loss-aversion, the context in which we will examine our questions of 
rationality.  In this chapter we will look at specific, well-documented examples of loss-
aversion, with the hope that in our discussion of rationality in these cases, a clearer 
vision of Rg will emerge.  In defining Rg along the lines of Ri, I have already implied that 
an internalist move away from Re is an essential first step towards Rg; in this chapter our 
case studies will demonstrate why this is so.  
§1. Case 1:  Loss-Aversion in Risk-free Context 
In the first chapter we looked at a few of the many interesting studies of loss-
aversion in risky choices, but I have also made the case that loss-aversion is most easily 
isolated in riskless contexts, so I have defined our first case study simply by the lack of 
risk.  Kahneman and Tversky present a case where responders are asked to imagine they 
currently hold a part-time job as part of their professional training, and will soon be 
given the choice between taking job x and taking job y.  The relevant details pertaining 
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to the overall utility of these jobs, as well as the present part-time job, are summarized 
below: 
Table 2: The Job Choice, Part 1 
 Social Contact Daily Travel Time 
Present job (training) Isolated for long stretches 10 min. 
Job x Limited contact with others 20 min. 
Job y Moderately sociable 60 min. 
 
 In this example, 70% of respondents chose job x.25  This is just the first half of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment, and they make no conclusions about loss-aversion 
at this juncture, but considering here whether one might be able to identify loss-
aversion can be an instructive exercise.  One might surmise (possibly correctly) that loss-
aversion is what made job x more attractive to the respondents who chose it.  The 
respondent gains moderately in social interaction but loses moderately in daily travel 
time.  He could gain much more in social interaction by choosing job y, but this would 
come at the price of losing much more in daily travel time.  Since losses loom larger than 
gains, job x is more attractive.   
 Thus we have an explanation via loss-aversion, but the next question of whether 
this loss-aversion is irrational should wait for a better example, for with this one isolated 
choice there is not sufficient evidence that loss-aversion even influenced the decision.  
Perhaps the loss-aversion explanation becomes the most likely explanation if we assume 
                                                             
25 Tversky and Kahneman, “Loss Aversion” 148-149. 
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the respondents happen to value travel time and social contact roughly equally in the 
increments this problem presents, but we have no warrant for assuming that.  It’s 
plausible that the majority of the respondents values low travel time much more than 
high social interaction, and so the choice was simply for the lesser of two evils:  a slight 
increase in travel time over a larger increase.  Social interaction would weigh in the 
decision very little when compared to travel time, and the respondents simply wanted 
to minimize their losses in terms of travel time.  It is important to note that such cases 
of people choosing to minimize their losses are not necessarily cases of loss-aversion—
they could be just an instance of people choosing the higher expected utility on the 
dimension which, according to their subjective utilities, matters more to them (travel 
time in this example).  Loss-aversion, by contrast, is when losses looming larger than 
gains causes agents to violate the prescriptions of decision theory, or—what would be 
more serious in our study—our working definition of a rational decision.  
This example nicely demonstrates the trouble we should have trying to apply our 
definitions of right and rational decisions to isolated choices.  We do not know whether 
the 70% majority of the respondents made the ‘right’ choice, for that depends on how 
they assign goodness.  Perhaps it was right, for it is certainly plausible that they assign 
more goodness to saving on travel time than to gaining pleasant social interaction, but 
we do not have any evidence for this (unless we counted their choice as evidence, but 
this would beg the question).  Also, we cannot say whether the decision is ‘rational’ 
because we don’t know what they had most reason to do unless we know their ends.  If 
one of their ends is to minimize travel time, however, and this takes priority over the 
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end of increasing social interaction at work, one could easily see this decision as 
rational, and loss-aversion would be a non-issue.   
So a case for irrationality according to our working definitions would go 
nowhere.  What may come as a more of a surprise, however, is that it would also go 
nowhere according to Re.  I have presented the proponent of Re as more ready to label a 
decision irrational, but even she would not do so in this case of one isolated decision.  
This is because of a point that she, I and the proponent of Ri all agree on:  talk of 
rationality really makes sense only within a pattern, or set, of decisions.  This is the idea 
Davidson has in mind when he states, “Strictly speaking, then, the irrationality consists 
not in any particular belief but in inconsistency within a set of beliefs.”26  Re applies 
principles of rationality more stringent than anything I or the Ri proponent would apply, 
as evidenced by the fact that Re is more often calling decisions irrational.  But this is only 
because Re’s principles are formalized for application and are often accompanied by 
operating assumptions, and even the Re proponent needs a set of decisions in order to 
apply those principles and get a case for irrationality off the ground.27  It may seem Re is 
already giving important ground to Ri on this point, but I think soon it will be clear that 
Re can restrict itself to examining the consistency of a set of decisions while retaining its 
economic and externalist character.  
                                                             
26 Donald Davidson, “Incoherence and Irrationality,” Problems of Rationality, ed. Davidson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004) 192.    
27 One might argue that the Re proponent would argue that an isolated decision is irrational, in the case 
that it is a decision towards an end that is sufficiently absurd so that we can call the end irrational (as this 
move is in play for the externalist).  Perhaps, but I think this objection may be conflating an irrational 
decision with an irrational end.  In any case, we don’t see rational choice theorists making charges of 
irrationality in this manner, and at this point I am more concerned with the charges of irrationality that Re 
makes via economic principles. 
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 So far we have stepped only halfway into Kahneman and Tversky’s job choice 
example.  Doing so has yielded some important insights: one about how choices to 
minimize one’s losses are not necessarily instances of loss-aversion, and thus not of 
questionable rationality; the other about how rationality becomes an issue only when 
considering sets of decisions, or decisions in contexts.  A look at the full example now 
will raise more substantial questions about rationality.  Kahneman and Tversky had 
subjects respond to two versions of the problem.  The second version differs from the 
first (which we have already looked at) only in the details of the present, part-time 
training job. 
Table 3: The Job Choice, Part 2 
 Social Contact Daily Travel Time 
Present job (training), Version 1 Isolated for long stretches 10 min. 
Present job (training), Version 2 Much pleasant social interaction 80 min. 
Job x Limited contact with others 20 min. 
Job y Moderately sociable 60 min. 
 
 Recall that 70% chose job x in version one of the problem.  In version two 
however, only 33% chose job x.28  Now, within the context of two decisions, one can 
make a better case for an irrational decision due to loss-aversion.  Let’s take a typical 
respondent, who preferred job x in version one and job y in version two, and name him 
Joe.  We can make a case for Joe’s irrationality according to our tentative Rg because we 
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can say Joe’s choice in version one implies he has an end of saving on travel time which 
he ranks as more important than any end he might have to increase his social 
interaction at work.  Therefore in version two, given Joe’s ends, he had most reason to 
choose job x again, since it offered a great gain in the reduction of travel time.  It would 
come at the cost of a loss in social interaction, but that matters less to Joe than travel 
time.  Joe had most reason to choose x, and since the details of the situation are 
relatively simple, we assume Joe knew that.  Therefore, by our definition Joe’s choice of 
y in version two was irrational.  There is also the possibility that Joe’s choice in version 
two reflects his true preferences, but then that would mean his choice in version one 
was irrational.  One way or the other, Joe has made an irrational decision. 
 We can make a case for Joe’s irrationality according to Rg, and we can certainly 
make one according to Re.  In fact, much of the general reasoning is the same in both 
cases.  Re uses a couple of formal principles to make the case, however.  The first is the 
principle of reference independence.  Kahneman and Tversky state this principle 
formally as, “x ≥r y iff x ≥s y for all x,y,r,s ∈ X,”
29 meaning that one’s point of reference 
(be it r, which could be the training job in version one, or s, which could be the training 
job in version two) should not affect the preference order of two options (jobs x and y in 
our example) that are the same in either situation.  Kahneman and Tversky think that to 
make the charge that this is an irrational decision because it violates preference 
invariance, an assumption of reference independence is necessary.  Preference 
invariance, the second principle (more widely cited in Re than reference independence), 
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“requires that the preference order between prospects should not depend on the 
manner in which they are described.”30  Re’s case for irrationality in ordinary language, 
then, is similar to Rg’s:  Joe’s first choice reveals a preference for job x over job y, and 
the only difference in the second version is that his training job has changed.  Jobs x and 
y are exactly the same, however (reference independence), so his choosing job y in the 
second version is irrational (preference invariance). 
 Thus we have a simple, plausible example of an irrational decision due to loss-
aversion.  Joe is not making a decision according to coherent preferences; instead, fear 
of losing what he has makes him value low travel time over high social interaction one 
moment, then the exact opposite the next.  The time has come, however, to consider 
what Ri has to say on the matter. 
§2. The Internalist Objection 
As the case for Joe’s irrationality rests on the assumption of reference 
independence, this is the obvious place for the internalist to make his challenge.  One 
can imagine countless scenarios where it simply wouldn’t apply.  For example, Joe might 
say that a daily commute of sixty minutes or more would require him to buy a new, 
more reliable car, and he would rather just keep his old car and make shorter 
commutes.  This is why in version one, he chose job x, but since in version two he was 
already required to buy a new car to get to his training job, he chose job y.  In this case 
we wouldn’t have jobs x and y equivalent in both versions.  Instead we would have jobs 
x1,y1,x2,y2, where job x1 differs from job x2 because one is taken coming from version 
                                                             
30 Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices, Values, and Frames,” Choices, Values, and Frames, ed. Kahneman and 
Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 4. 
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one’s training job while the other is taken coming from version two’s training job.  There 
would be nothing inconsistent, then, about Joe’s simultaneously holding x1 ≥ y1 and y2 ≥ 
x2, and preference invariance would be a non-issue. 
This is an obvious case where I think even Re would readily admit that reference 
independence does not apply.  The Re proponent need not give up her case for Joe’s 
irrationality, however.  She could admit that the example is bare—we know absolutely 
nothing about Joe except what we can infer from his two decisions.  Of course we have 
to assume reference independence in order for the example to even be interesting, to 
get off the ground.  She might point out that Kahneman and Tversky have identified this 
assumption of reference independence as an implicit, not often-stated one in standard 
rational choice theory:  “Because the standard theory does not recognize the special 
role of the reference state, it implicitly assumes reference independence.”31  The people 
who mention this assumption are the ones who want to attack it.  Those in the Re camp 
are well-aware of this assumption, but also know it is necessary in order to get to 
interesting questions of irrationality. 
The internalist need not be satisfied with this reply, however.  He might ask 
exactly when we should assume reference independence, and when we should not.  Of 
course in the scenario above, it obviously wouldn’t apply, but the point of the obvious 
example for the internalist is that if it didn’t apply in that case, might there be other 
cases where it doesn’t apply in more subtle ways—ways that Re has not appreciated?  
Certainly getting the right answer to this question matters; just blindly assuming 
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reference independence for the sake of theory might produce beautiful theory, but 
what good will that theory be in application?   
The internalist could press the issue of reference independence thus, but at this 
point I am more interested in another direction he could take.  I imagine our internalist 
granting the assumption in this case for the sake of argument.  Then, becoming familiar 
with what is in his internalist toolbox, he turns to an even bolder objection:  even if we 
grant reference independence, why must we accept the principle of preference 
invariance?   
The internalist could start this objection by referencing our current Rg and its 
internalist flavor:  it says that choosing x is rational when the agent has most reason to 
choose x, given ends that he has internalized and knows.  It seems that if we want to call 
Joe irrational for violating preference invariance we need to establish that he has 
internalized and knows the end of observing preference invariance.  But why should we 
assume this?  Isn’t it possible that Joe simply doesn’t care about preference invariance, 
or whether or not he fits the rational choice theorist’s conception of rational?  
Interviewing Joe we might find that he agrees with the reference independence 
assumption—that the two options are exactly the same to him regardless of which 
training job he has—but he chose differently in the two versions because he “felt like 
it,” or “just wanted to.”  He has never adopted an end that bars his preferences from 
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radically changing from one minute to the next.32  Such consistency matters to the 
rational choice theorists, but not to him, and as such he has no reason to strive for it. 
In defending Joe, the internalist has turned him into a strange character, and 
may have second thoughts about wanting to call him rational in any normative sense 
(the sense we are concerned with here).  This is the logical consequence of Ri that has 
been waiting to be flushed out, however, and like it or not the internalist has done good 
work to bring it out.  It points to the underlying problem with Ri—that it threatens to 
strip any sense of normativity from rationality.  No matter how bizarre or 
incomprehensible someone’s behavior may seem to us, we cannot call it irrational 
unless we can establish that he has an end the pursuit of which would preclude him 
from looking bizarre or incomprehensible to us.  It seems any charge of irrationality can 
be easily escaped by an appeal to internal ends that might be difficult for others to 
understand, much less plug into a formal decision theory.  The concept of rationality’s 
power to shape and improve our behavior would be lost. 
§3. Consistency and the First Externalist Check 
Joe’s notion of rationality described above is not wrong or useless—it is useful 
and interesting as a descriptive account of one of the many psychological manifestations 
of human reasoning.  But given that a goal of this study is to preserve some normativity 
in rationality so that our final Rg can still support a formal rational choice theory, I think 
we must draw an externalist line here and insist on a basic consistency.  It amounts to 
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above.  Re would recognize that preferences can change over time.  The more radical and rapid the 
change appears, however, the more likely it is a case of simultaneous contradictory preferences. 
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saying that rationality, as we have defined it, entails a basic consistency or coherence, 
one that is not optional. 
This move may seem like a blow against Ri, but it should not be viewed that way.  
Although we cannot accept the extreme of rejecting preference invariance that it 
appeared Ri wanted to push, even with this externalist line drawn Ri can still exert a 
strong influence on the normativity-capable Rg that we want, and it need not betray 
itself in doing so.  This issue of consistency exemplifies what I mentioned above about 
the intuitive and internalist notions not being identical, for perhaps the intuitive notion 
holds that overall consistency should be an optional end just like every other end, but 
no version of internalism that I have found has claimed this.  In fact, it is often the 
internalist versions that state a consistency requirement the best. 
Hollis nicely captures the consistency requirement of the paradigm internalist, 
Williams, when he states: 
The purpose—indeed the merit in many ways—of insisting on internal reasons is 
to respect the actual motivations of the actor.  Respect means that there can be 
no further complaint about an actor who has achieved a self-conscious reflective 
consistency… The actor’s most general project cannot be irrational, provided 
that it is consistent, after the usual discounting for cost, likelihood, and so 
forth.33 
 
For Williams, consistency is not an optional end; rather it is ultimately the one criterion 
upon which we can judge a person’s rationality. 
 We can find similar commitments to consistency in Davidson’s work.  As we 
noted above, Davidson means irrationality to be “the failure, within a single person, of 
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coherence or consistency in the pattern of beliefs, attitudes, emotions, intentions, and 
actions.”34 In another place he declares that his present interest  
is entirely with cases, if such there be, in which the judgment that the works or 
thoughts of an agent are irrational is not based, or at least not necessarily based, 
on disagreement over fact or norm…  We should limit ourselves to cases in which 
an agent acts, thinks, or feels counter to his own conception of what is 
reasonable; cases where there is some sort of inner inconsistency or 
incoherence.35 
 
 These interpretations are decidedly internalist, yet committed to an external (in 
the sense that it is not a matter of the agent’s choosing) standard of consistency.  From 
what we have seen, the tension with intuitive rationality’s idea in the Joe case—that if 
we are to truly respect internal reasons, we should respect Joe’s rejection of preference 
invariance and not call him irrational—has not been addressed.  Davidson shows that he 
appreciates such a tension when he states, “If the agent does not have the principle that 
he ought to act on what he holds to be best, everything considered, then though his 
action may be irrational from our point of view, it need not be irrational from his point 
of view.”36  But in the end, Williams and Davidson are not on board with intuitive 
rationality’s idea:  they respect internal reasons only insofar as they conform to a 
standard of consistency.  So far we have seen them stating that, but we have not seen 
an argument in support of this stance. 
 Throughout Davidson’s work he does offer plenty that can be distilled into an 
argument for the consistency requirement, however.  For example, his argument for the 
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conclusion that “it is a condition of having thoughts, judgments and intentions that the 
basic standards of rationality have application,”37 can be applied to our present question 
of consistency.  I reconstruct the argument here: 
P1.  A propositional attitude is constituted, in part, by the logical relations 
between it and other propositional attitudes. 
P2.  The laws that govern these logical relations (i.e. the laws of logic) are 
(ideally) expressed by our basic standards of rationality. 
P3.  Being a thinking, judging being entails holding propositional attitudes. 
C1. Being a thinking, judging being entails being subject to the basic standards of 
rationality.38 
P4. Many basic standards of rationality are equivalently expressed as a 
requirement of consistency. 
C2.  Being a thinking, judging being entails being subject to a requirement of 
consistency. 
 
 The proposition that needs the most unpacking is P1.  I take this premise from 
Davidson’s statement that “beliefs, intentions, and desires are identified, first, by their 
causal relations to events and objects in the world, and, second, by their relations to 
one another.”39  Setting aside the first identifier (causal relations) because it is irrelevant 
to the issue at hand, and turning to the second, he explains that the belief that it is 
going to rain, for example, does not really pass for that belief if, when held in 
conjunction with the desire to stay dry, it does not produce some appropriate action, 
like taking an umbrella.  In order for a belief to be the belief it purports to be, it must 
bear the proper logical relations to other beliefs, intentions and desires.40  This is why he 
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can claim that “such (logical) relations are constitutive of the propositional attitudes,”41 
and this is my warrant for P1. 
 I think that the rest of the argument is unproblematic.  With P2, certainly the 
question of how well the standards of rationality actually reflect these laws is up for 
debate (That is, in a sense, what I am doing with this thesis.), but that ideally they would 
is less controversial.  For P3, I think making propositional attitudes a necessary condition 
for being a thinking, judging being is acceptable.  The first conclusion, Davidson’s, 
follows validly from the premises. If one accepts P4, which I will try to support if it is not 
already convincing, one should accept the second conclusion, mine, for our issue of 
consistency. 
 Davidson has a complex network of arguments supporting the central claim (C1), 
one to which I cannot give adequate treatment here.  I think I have accurately 
represented a strong argument that he would give regarding our issue at hand, 
however.  What his argument provides is a way for us to support what may have been a 
gut reaction as soon as the objection (“What if Joe rejects the end of observing 
preference invariance?”) was raised—that this move, insofar as it amounts to a rejection 
of overall consistency, is out of play.  Another way to state this would be to say that the 
end of overall consistency is a second-order (or perhaps we need to go to a higher-
order) end, or (depending on your vertical preference) a deeper-seated end, and 
therefore is not subject to our choosing or rejecting, as are our first-order ends.  It might 
be even better to state that it is improper to call the consistency requirement an end at 
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all—rather it is a guiding principle that all thinking, judging beings, by definition, 
observe.  All these points stand in accord with the formal argument above. 
 It might further clarify things if I explain that in some senses of ‘consistency,’ we 
can in fact choose not to observe a consistency requirement and remain rational.  But 
obviously insofar as ‘consistency’ means something integral to rationality, we cannot 
violate it and remain rational.  For example, consistency in the form of the principle of 
reference independence (that one’s preference order of two options should remain 
consistent, regardless of her frame of reference) is a requirement that is often 
questionable.  I’ll argue (and have already begun to, somewhat) that rationality would 
actually often require us to reject it.  Preference invariance is a principle that seems to 
align more with an overarching sense of consistency, however, assuming that we take 
the proper precautions and apply it only when we can establish reference 
independence.  If, as in our Joe case, we cannot establish reference independence, 
preference invariance cannot apply, since the options are not really identical 
irrespective of reference points.   But if we assume reference independence, as we did, 
preference invariance becomes more akin to an overall consistency requirement. 
 The problem with the objection becomes most apparent when we unmask a 
disguised consistency requirement (like preference invariance), and just call it 
Consistency (the capital letter denoting overarching consistency).  It is certainly logically 
dissonant to contend that one’s inconsistency makes him Consistent, so long as 
inconsistency is his chosen end.  Since consistency is constitutive of rationality, I think 
this is also akin to contending that one’s irrational behavior makes him rational, since his 
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end is to be irrational.  One cannot directly contradict the definition of what it means to 
be x in order to be x. 
 Ri was not wrong in taking our working definition of rationality and running with 
it; for it doesn’t state explicitly that the end to violate consistency is off limits.  And, 
insofar as Ri wants to make a rejection of a rigid consistency (like reference 
independence), and not a rigid rejection of consistency, it will often be correct.  Nor 
does the fact that Ri was ultimately rebuked for this move need to be viewed as a blow 
against Ri, for Ri contains in its internalist aspect the solution to the problem its intuitive 
aspect creates.  In defending Joe, the intuitive notion came to fear the monster it 
created, but the internalist notion can handle Joe quite easily.   
 An internalist like Davidson would first insist that he could find an internal 
inconsistency in Joe, and that this would be sufficient to call him irrational.  Davidson 
states, “I should never have tried to pin you down to an admission that you ought to 
subscribe to the principles of decision theory.  For I think everyone does subscribe to 
those principles, whether he knows it or not,”42 which attests to the aforementioned 
point that the norms of rationality are not optional, as well as posits relevant 
information about Joe.  Despite his denials, Joe, being a thinking judging being, does 
strive for an overarching consistency, so his present violation is (or at least certainly 
could be) grounds for calling him irrational. 
 If, however, Davidson is wrong and Joe really doesn’t strive for an overarching 
consistency, then perhaps we cannot find the type of internal inconsistency we would 
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like to in order to label him irrational, but this is only because we cannot make sense of 
him at all.43  For Joe certainly falls outside our definition of rationality.  If one objects 
that it is trivial that we are calling him irrational simply because he falls outside our 
(some might argue arbitrary) definition of rationality, we should agree and point out 
that the much more pressing matter is that to us Joe does not qualify as a thinking, 
judging being.  On the issue of rationality, it would be more accurate to say that Joe is in 
the realm of the non-rational, for as we have seen from Davidson, irrationality is a 
failure within the house of reason, and Joe is not in that house. 
 Ri need not give in to Re, then.  It needs simply to embrace the more disciplined, 
internalist side of its nature.  Re should at least be able to claim, however, that Ri is 
making an externalist move by imposing an external standard of consistency (again, 
external in the sense of not being a matter of the agent’s choice), and point out that Ri’s 
quest to abolish preference invariance has failed, insofar as preference invariance is an 
expression of this basic consistency.  The reference independence assumption, however, 
is still up in the air.  Ri can still gain some ground on that front.  This is where we will 
turn in the next case study. 
§4. Case 2:  The Endowment Effect 
We have just seen Ri make a move that was successfully rebuked by Re (or, more 
accurately, by internalists giving an account in their own terms for an attractive feature 
of Re).  Ri’s mistake was that it went for too much, challenging the most basic tenets of 
what it means to be rational in any prescriptive sense of the word.  Nevertheless, its 
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method of questioning basic assumptions is one that can still bear much fruit.  Recall 
that reference independence was assumed for argument’s sake in the last case, but the 
merits of this assumption (how often it really applies) can still be challenged.  A couple 
examples that demonstrate what is called the endowment effect provide fertile ground 
to consider the merits of this assumption.   
  The endowment effect, which is the tendency to assign higher utility to the 
things in our possession than we would were those things not in our possession, seems 
to be at work in an experiment that involves the trade of a chocolate bar for a coffee 
mug.44 In the experiment three different classes at the University of Victoria were given 
different endowments.  The first class was given a coffee mug, asked to answer a 
questionnaire, then shown a 400-gram Swiss chocolate bar and told they could trade 
their mug for a chocolate bar if they desired.  Conditions were exactly the same for the 
second class, except the second class was initially given the chocolate bar and later 
given the opportunity to trade it for the coffee mug.  The third class was not given one 
or the other immediately—they were simply offered a choice between the candy bar 
and the mug.  The table below indicates the preferences of the three groups: 
Table 4: The Mug Trade 
Group Mug over Candy Candy over Mug 
1 (76 students) Give up mug to obtain candy 89% 11% 
2 (87) Give up candy to obtain mug 10% 90% 
3 (55) No initial entitlement 56% 44% 
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The preferences demonstrate the endowment effect because few who were 
endowed with either the mug or the candy bar were willing to trade for the other.  The 
third group served as a control group to reveal that the objective values of the mug and 
candy bar were roughly equal, since without initial entitlement the preferences were 
split 56-44.  Using groups of students makes a stronger case for loss-aversion at work in 
the endowment effect than if this reflected the preferences of just one respondent, but 
for the purposes of this discussion we will take one respondent with preferences typical 
of this group (when endowed with a mug, she prefers it 89-11 over a candy bar, when 
endowed with a candy bar she prefers it 90-10 over a mug, etc.) and name her Maude.  
As we did in our first case with Joe, we can build a case that Maude is making an 
irrational decision.  A rough sketch of it is that the third version reveals that Maude only 
slightly prefers a mug over the candy bar, but when Maude is endowed with a mug this 
preference becomes much stronger, and when Maude is endowed with a candy bar she 
suddenly has her strongest preference of all to keep the candy bar instead of trading it 
for the mug.   
As in our first case, Maude’s decisions can be viewed as irrational on both Rg and 
Re if we assume reference independence.  Maude’s frame of reference (whether she 
owns one or the other, or nothing) is irrelevant to her preferences regarding the candy 
bar and the mug, we assume, so there is clearly an inconsistency.  On the Rg 
interpretation, we would say that Maude’s initial strong preference for the mug over 
the candy reveals that she holds a mugs-over-candy-bars end, yet her second decision to 
retain the candy bar clearly contradicts the end that we cannot assume she so quickly 
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forgot about.  Or, in the words of the Re interpretation, we could simply say that Maude 
is violating preference invariance.     
This example is effective for introducing the endowment effect.  It is also better 
grounds for debating the reference independence assumption than our job example 
from Case 1, I believe, because this experiment involved the respondents in an actual 
situation and not a hypothetical one like the job choice.  In the actual case, it is harder 
to imagine a plethora of ways that reference dependence might come in to play (though 
it is not impossible), since the experiment is more tightly controlled.  The hypothetical 
case is more likely to invite considerations of reference dependence.   
A weakness of our current example, however, is that like Bernoulli’s fair game of 
chance example, it exposes loss-aversion (as the endowment effect) by identifying a 
case where we should be roughly indifferent, yet people consistently choose one way 
because losses loom larger than gains.  Thus, like Bernoulli’s example, it does not reveal 
the robustness of the endowment effect like other examples can.  It is not technically 
accurate to assume, as we did for our discussion, that a 90-10 preference among a 
group means that a single person should have a preference of that strength.  It could be 
that the endowment effect is usually negligible, but in cases like this one where the two 
options are roughly of equal utility, the usually negligible endowment effect is what 
consistently (to the tune of 90-10) tips the scales. 
A similar example that Kahneman and Tversky cite does more to reveal the 
robustness of the endowment effect.  In it a group of students at Simon Fraser 
University were grouped into three different classes:  buyers, sellers and choosers.  The 
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good in question was a SFU coffee mug.  The sellers, endowed with the mug when they 
entered the classroom, were given the chance to sell their mug for different prices 
ranging from $.25 to $9.25.  The buyers, endowed with nothing when they entered the 
room, were surveyed on the same price intervals and range, but were asked what prices 
they would be willing to pay for the mug.  The choosers, also endowed with nothing, 
were told they would be given a sum of money or the coffee mug, and were allowed to 
choose which they preferred at different prices within the range.  The groups’ responses 
are summarized below.45 
Table 5: The Mug Market 
Group Average   
Price 
1 Sellers:  would not sell the mug for less than $7.12 
2 Buyers:  would not buy the mug for more than $2.87 
3 Choosers:  would choose cash over the mug at any amount higher than $3.12 
 
Here the large difference between the sellers’ price and the buyers’ price attests 
to some robustness of the endowment effect.  If the choosers’ price is taken to be the 
unbiased, true value of the mug, it appears the endowment effect is stronger for the 
person who has recently acquired the mug (the seller) than for the person whose 
endowment is the money they already have (the buyer), since the sellers’ price is much 
farther off the choosers’ price than is the buyers’ price.  More important for our study, 
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however, is that the case for Maude’s irrationality (Maude being someone who would 
have these different average prices for her value of the mug as seller, buyer and 
chooser) can again be made, in exactly the same manner as was done above with the 
mug-candy bar example.  The only difference here is that since the difference in 
preferences is more robust, we have a stronger basis for postulating the endowment 
effect as responsible for Maude’s change in preferences.  
§5. The Internalist Move, Part Two 
 The internalist’s earlier challenge of the assumption of reference independence 
was tabled, but now the time is ripe for such a challenge.  Once again, such an 
assumption is necessary to get a case for Maude’s irrationality off the ground.  Maude is 
being irrational, the story goes, because her valuation of the mug is changing drastically 
depending on her state of reference (whether she is seller, buyer or chooser).46  But the 
value the mug has to her should hold constant—it shouldn’t depend on that irrelevant 
detail.  If we accept this assumption, the violation of preference invariance follows. 
 As I mentioned above, there might be more of a reason to assume reference 
independence in this example than in our job example.  Even in this example, where 
such an assumption might be more plausible than in the job example, I see no 
compelling reason to accept it.  The assertion that the mug should have exactly the 
same value to us whether we are looking to buy or sell it is one that just does not agree 
with common practice (and it certainly did not agree with the above experiment’s 
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results).  I suspect most people would agree that selling a coffee mug we own for $x 
does not bring us quite the same utility (not quite as much) as receiving $x immediately, 
in lieu of ever owning the mug.  It is even less like the utility of holding on to $x already 
in our possession and passing up a chance to purchase the mug for that price.  Yet 
reference independence assumes these three utilities are equivalent—it insists that the 
reference point does not matter, when in fact we know it does.  Even a formalized, 
prescriptive notion should be able to do better than this.  
 A more sophisticated version of rational choice theory does take these things 
into account, somewhat, when it includes costs that come with trading, factoring in 
negative utility that comes with the inconvenience of trading goods.  Re is generally 
limited to identifying such costs in concrete terms like time lost, however, and while 
such adjustments by rational choice theory may start to account for Maude’s disparity in 
the amount she is willing to pay for the mug versus the amount she is willing to accept, 
it is hard to believe the inconvenience of trading, defined in quantifiable units like time 
lost, is solely responsible for the wide gap.  One can imagine an experiment being 
designed where the concrete costs of trading are next to nothing, yet Maude’s 
discrepancy persists.  The leftover discrepancy, unaccounted for by concrete costs of 
trading, is Maude’s irrationality, Re would say. 
 Here Ri would point to our intuition that such labeling of Maude is not accurate.  
It seems that besides the concrete costs of trading, there might be other negative 
utilities for Maude involved in giving up the mug.  One of the most obvious is the idea 
that she might have formed an emotional attachment to the mug when she received it, 
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so that parting with it would bring her negative feelings.  There is also the idea that she 
would fear before, during and after the exchange being shortchanged—not getting as 
much money for it as she should.  We can imagine how Re, holding to its charge of 
irrationality, might reply: if she feels negative emotions about giving up the mug, she 
should also feel negative emotions about passing up the opportunity to get money in 
exchange for the mug.  Why should the negative emotion from the loss of the mug 
outweigh the negative emotion from the loss of the opportunity?  As for the fear of 
getting a bad deal:  if she fears getting a bad deal in exchanging the mug, she should 
equally fear passing up a good deal.   
 If Re does reply this way, it gives hope to Ri because it seems that Re has actually 
moved away from the reference independence assumption.  Instead of holding that the 
reference point is entirely irrelevant, Re seems to be admitting that the reference point 
does introduce emotional utilities—just emotional utilities that should cancel out.  But 
the assumption that those utilities should cancel out is just as questionable as the 
reference independence assumption, and I believe this debate could continue in this 
way at length, threatening to lose the point.  The main point is that the negative 
emotions associated with loss, what I am calling emotional utilities, do need to be 
considered, at the very least.  A picture of rationality that completely ignores them and 
labels a decision that is apparently based on them as irrational is a picture too-narrow 
and not very useful.  The better route for Re is to at least entertain the possibility of 
incorporating emotional utility into rational choice theory’s utility calculus, rather than 
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making a premature conclusion that such emotional responses are always a force of 
irrationality. 
 Work has already begun on establishing the legitimacy of emotional utility, and 
although it has not always been done by traditional backers of Re, the results should be 
of interest to Re regardless.  One burgeoning field that tries to assign quantified utilities 
to the emotions that accompany losing one’s goods (or at least asserts that such an 
assignment should be possible) is neuroeconomics.  Benoit Hardy-Valleé, in a brief 
paper on the topic, describes neuroeconomics as “the study of neural mechanisms 
involved in decision-making and their economic significance.”47  He identifies different 
regions of the brain connected with different aspects of decision-making, and a crucial 
part of the picture he paints embraces what he calls “the distributed account of utility” 
that he attributes to Kahneman.  Instead of one general notion of utility, this distributed 
account posits four types of utility that comprise an agent’s overall utility.  The first is 
decision utility, which is “the expected gains and losses or cost and benefits.”  I take 
decision utility to be closest to the utility that a very simplified rational choice theory 
uses, and it might often be measured simply in dollars.  The next is experienced utility, 
which is “the hedonic, pleasant or unpleasant affect” associated with the outcome.  
Next is predicted utility, which is “the anticipation of experienced utility,” and last is 
remembered utility:  “how experienced utility is remembered after the decision [and 
after the outcome, we might want to add], e.g. regretting or rejoicing.” 48  
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 With this notion of utility and the findings of neuroeconomics, Hardy-Valleé 
offers the following “more precise explanation of loss aversion:”49 
Neuroeconomics explains loss-aversion as the interaction of neural structures 
involved in the anticipation, registration and computation of the hedonic affect 
of a risky decision.  The amygdala, a structure involved in fear, emotional 
learning and memory modulation, registers the emotional impact of the loss; the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex predicts that a loss will result in a given affective 
impact; and midbrain dopaminergic neurons compute the probability and 
magnitude of the loss (Naqvi, Shiv and Bechara; Tom et al.)  Subjects are thus 
loss-averse because they tend to have or already had a negative response to 
losses (experienced utility).  When they expect a loss to occur (decision utility), 
they anticipate their affective reaction (predicted utility).  They might be also 
attempting to minimize their post-decision feeling of regret (remembered 
utility).50 
 The finer details of Hardy-Valleé’s account are not as important for us as its 
overall implication:  emotional utility (closest to what he calls “experienced utility”) is a 
real phenomenon with a predictable corresponding brain activity.  Joshua Greene found 
a similar connection in a study he and collaborators did involving activity in different 
brain areas during the making of difficult moral decisions.  In this study, decisions of 
three classes were posed to test subjects—non-moral, moral-impersonal, and moral-
personal—the three classes being designed to elicit increasing amounts of emotional 
engagement within the respondent.  The data supported the hypothesis, as activity in 
brain areas associated with emotion was consistently highest in the moral-personal 
decisions.  It was also noted that decisions that went against what the common 
emotional reaction would dictate (what Greene calls “emotionally incongruent” 
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decisions) consistently took more reaction time than did the more reflexive emotionally 
congruent decisions.51  After further research Greene would later make a more general 
conclusion that the emotion-connected areas of the brain are especially influential in 
making quick (presumably relatively non-reflective) decisions that involve emotional 
engagement.  In most cases this mechanism works fine, Greene suggests, but in some 
cases, usually in uncommon circumstances, it leads to decisions of questionable 
rationality.52   
 Re might correctly point out here that these studies do not make the case that 
such decisions, with emotional aspects, are in fact rational.  Re can maintain just as 
easily as before that the loss-averse decisions in question are irrational.  To isolate an 
area of the brain active during the decision does not mean that the decision is not 
irrational; it could just as easily be seen as finding the culprit, the part of the brain that, 
when activated, leads us to irrational decisions.   
 Re’s objection is useful in bringing us back to the point, but again it seems that if 
we fully accepted Re’s objection we would be prematurely dismissing an important issue 
that warrants much further study.  As more studies are done, the emotional responses 
look increasingly like normal human responses, and we should be cautious in labeling 
such responses irrational, lest we reaffirm what is unfortunately the common practice of 
calling people consistently irrational.  Certainly other possible explanations for this 
behavior should be considered, not the least of which is an evolutionary hypothesis for 
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loss-aversion, which would say that evolution has favored those who seek to keep the 
things they have.  In other words, the advantageous nature of loss-aversion has caused 
it to evolve as a normal human response, and this is why we are habitually loss-averse.   
 Seeing loss-aversion as rational qua evolved behavior certainly requires a 
zoomed-out, larger-scale view on what makes a decision rational.  Decisions that seem 
irrational when isolated can be part of a broader pattern of behavior that over a course 
of time—perhaps a lifetime, perhaps even several generations—proves to be 
advantageous.  The idea of loss-aversion being advantageous in decision theory is 
analogous to the well-documented phenomenon in game theory of apparently irrational 
decisions in The Ultimatum Game proving to be advantageous over the long run.  In The 
Ultimatum Game, player one is given an amount of goods (typically $10) to split 
between herself and player two.  Player two, when given player one’s offer (typically 
anything between $0 and $10 in $1-increments), has the choice to take it, in which case 
player one keeps the rest, or leave it, in which case neither player gets anything.   
 By rational choice theory, player one should offer $1 to player two (thus keeping 
$9 for herself), and player two should accept the offer.  Actual results are quite 
different, however, as player two will consistently reject low offers, even though 
rational choice theory tells her getting something is better than nothing.  Player two 
disregards that maxim, and wants to punish player one for what she perceives as an 
unfair offer.  When this game is iterated with the same players, a norm of fairness will 
develop, unfair offers are made with decreasing frequency, and both players might be 
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said to benefit.53  Player one might make less money than if she had repeatedly made 
only $1 offers, but only if her $1 offers to player two were not consistently rejected 
leaving her with nothing.  By making fair offers she gets a decent amount (around $5 or 
$6) consistently and with much more certainty.  Player two clearly benefits because she 
can accept $4 or $5 each time instead of just $1.  
 The analogy between loss-aversion and this behavior in game theory and its 
long-term advantages is just one more point on the side of admitting emotional utility 
into the utility calculus.  The actual work of this incorporation would undoubtedly 
require researchers and theorists to take this zoomed-out view, and this is a view that Re 
is not well-equipped for.  Re’s strength is looking at isolated decisions and judging their 
rationality on a micro-level, not considering what might be rational  given long-term 
considerations of overall well-being.  I see Re as having to make a choice, however, 
between on the one hand trying to incorporate emotional utility and on the other hand 
doggedly insisting that emotional utility is an illegitimate factor in rational choice theory, 
taking a hard-line in order to preserve questionable assumptions like reference 
independence, keeping a neat theory whose applicability steadily decreases as we learn 
more about human behavior. 
 It’s obvious what I think the better option is for Re, but hopefully I have offered 
some good support for that claim.  I hope to have shown, specifically, that the reference 
independence assumption is often inappropriate because it excludes the emotional 
utilities—which I have argued are legitimate—that are often very dependent on a 
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person’s reference point.  Insofar as I have been convincing, we can claim a major 
victory at this point for Ri.  It appears that we should leave room in the utility calculus 
for emotional utility, and that Ri can successfully challenge the key assumptions of Re.  
 This victory for Ri does not come without its dangers, however, and just as Ri 
went too far after internal reasons were admitted by questioning overall consistency, it 
could once again go too far with emotional utility.  Whether Ri makes the move itself, in 
its familiar self-destructive fashion, or Re points us to the problem, the problem itself 
remains the same:  it appears that once we admit emotional utility into the utility 
calculus we could be issuing a free pass for the rationality of any decision where 
emotion is involved.  This is in part because we currently know so little about quantified 
emotional utility, but the more basic issue is that it is not clear how we should 
objectively quantify emotional utility at all.  Also it’s unclear on what grounds we could 
ever deny the legitimacy of an emotional utility.  The consequence is that even 
emotional utilities that seem outlandish to most, like ones resulting from an extremely, 
disproportionately strong emotional attachment to an object, could be the bases for 
decisions we must call rational.  Again the normativity we want for rationality is 
threatened.  A goal of the next chapter will be to look at examples that highlight this 
problem, and to impose a final important externalist check. 
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CHAPTER 3:  TO A GLOBAL RATIONALITY 
 
In the first two chapters I aimed to show that when starting with the principles 
and structure of Re, the way to Rg necessarily includes important internalist moves away 
from Re.  Contrary to the manner in which Re is often applied, we should be considering 
what an agent knows when making a decision, the balance of the agent’s internal 
reasons (while holding a basic consistency requirement on this matter), and the agent’s 
emotional utilities.  Overall these moves appear to affirm Ri over Re.  But we have also 
seen that important externalist checks are necessary along the way if the concept of 
rationality is not to become a trivial one, stripped of its normativity and its power to 
help us recognize and correct irrational behavior.  In Chapter Three one more important 
externalist check will be added to our conception of Rg.  I will then step back and 
consider the implications Rg has for the future of rational choice theory and decision 
theory, as well as what it means for the individual seeking to be rational. 
§1. Case 3:  Framing Effects 
 The third case study will present the strongest case we have seen for an 
assumption of reference independence, and consequently that some common decisions 
are irrational.  In cases of this type, the only significant difference between two sets of 
options is the language in which they are described, or “framed.”  Since emotional 
utilities have been admitted, it is possible that such utilities should really depend on and 
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vary according to the framing of an option, thus negating reference independence and 
the case for irrationality.  This idea should certainly be challenged, however. 
 A simple example presented by Kahneman and Tversky demonstrates loss-averse 
decisions due to framing effects.  In it, respondents are asked whether they would be 
willing to participate in two separate lotteries as described below: 
1:  Would you accept a gamble that offers a 10% chance to win $95 and a 90% 
chance to lose $5? 
2:  Would you pay $5 to participate in a lottery that offers a 10% chance to win 
$100 and a 90% chance to win nothing?54 
 
We should note that risk is involved in this example, unlike our first two case studies.  By 
this point we should be familiar enough with loss-aversion that we should be able to 
focus on that phenomenon without risk-aversion or risk-seeking interfering.  This is 
especially true because the two questions seem to pose equally risky prospects, so again 
the element of risk is controlled.     
 The curious result this example produced is that of the 132 undergraduates 
questioned, 42 rejected the first gamble but accepted the lottery in 2.55  If we take one 
of those 42 respondents and call him Frank, we can again make the case that Frank is 
making an irrational decision.  As usual we would have to assume reference 
independence to make that case, but that looks like a safe assumption here, for the only 
difference between the two propositions is the language used to describe them.  As 
their final outcomes go, they are identical.  Nothing about Frank’s point of reference is 
changing between the two problems; since it is the framing of the problems that is 
                                                             
54 Kahneman and Tversky, “Choices” 15. 
55 Kahneman and Tversky 15. 
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different, we might say the only issue to debate is not the one of reference 
independence, but what we might call “framing independence.” 
 Whatever we want to call it, however, the assumption seems reasonable, and 
the case for Frank’s irrationality is that in the first problem he rejected the gamble, 
revealing his preferences, yet in the second problem he accepted the equivalent lottery, 
which proposed the exact same net results with the same probabilities.  Frank is clearly 
violating preference invariance, and the loss-aversion hypothesis says the presence of 
the word “lose” in the first problem caused him to give a higher weight to the possible 
loss than in the second, where he is asked to “pay” a cost up front for chances to “win” 
different amounts.56  Frank is displaying an inner inconsistency that produces a decision 
we can call irrational on Re’s view, or potentially irrational according to our current Rg.   
 The reason we call Frank’s decision only potentially irrational by Rg, of course, is 
the knowledge requirement.  Unless we know that Frank was fully aware of the 
equivalence of the two problems, this decision would not fit our definition of a full-
fledged irrational decision.  While the equivalence in this example is fairly transparent, it 
is certainly plausible that Frank did not see and appreciate this equivalence, especially if 
                                                             
56 Although I stated above that I think the element of risk is mostly neutralized in this experiment, there is 
one difference in wording that may be significant:  the first problem is called a “gamble” while the second 
is called a “lottery.”  I can’t rule out that this difference may have elicited slightly different responses from 
people depending on their attitudes towards risk.  It’s unfortunate for my purposes that they didn’t just 
frame both problems as “lotteries,” though I understand it’s technically incorrect to call the first problem 
a lottery.  Anyway, I maintain that the most influential difference in the framing comes from the “loss-
cost” difference, as do Kahneman and Tversky (15). 
As an interesting side note, Kahneman and Tversky postulate that this example demonstrates what they 
call a “cost-loss discrepancy,” meaning that not only do losses loom larger than gains (the standard 
definition of loss-aversion) but that losses loom larger than costs too, even if the difference between the 




his thought process was disrupted by feeling put on the spot or compelled to answer 
quickly.  We can imagine a scenario where Frank comes to realize the equivalence of the 
two problems and sees the error in his ways.  He realizes that if he did not want to 
accept the first gamble, he has no reason for wanting to accept the second, equivalent 
lottery, so he changes his answer to no for the second case as well.  This would be a 
predictable, sensible story about Frank’s loss-averse reaction causing a potentially 
irrational decision, but when Frank has sufficient opportunity to reflect the loss-aversion 
dissolves, and he can make consistent and rational decisions. 
 While the above scenario nicely demonstrates how loss-aversion in itself is not 
irrational, only that it has the potential to cause irrational decisions, it is not the most 
interesting scenario to consider.  I have implied that were Frank’s loss-aversion not to 
dissolve and he maintained his original choices, then we would certainly call him 
irrational.  In light of the emotional utilities we have admitted into Rg, however, it is not 
so clear that this is the case.  While we are assuming in this scenario that the knowledge 
requirement has been met, even then, if Frank’s loss-aversion persists regardless, can Rg 
really call him irrational?  We can imagine Frank explaining that he does see that the 
two cases are equivalent, still he doesn’t care.  The mere presence of the word “lose” in 
the first problem causes a loss-averse emotional utility in him, and he feels he must 
account for that in order to make the right choice.  There is the brute fact of the 
negative emotional utility for the first problem that he can’t help, regardless of his 
knowledge that there is really no difference, he explains.  This is the scenario that 
exposes the problems that come along with admitting emotional utility into Rg. 
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§2. The Uncomfortable Internalist Commitment 
Rg’s current predicament is due to the fact that it moved away from Re and 
towards Ri in accepting emotional utilities as legitimate.  Ri may try to assuage Rg’s 
concerns by pointing out that it has intuition on its side (and in its name) and offering 
the intuitive answer.  We know that Frank who adjusts his decisions (Franka) is being 
more rational than Frank who persists in his original choices (Frankp) because Franka is 
turning away from an irrational emotion whereas Frankp is clinging to it.  The loss-
aversion is an irrational emotion in this example because reflection uncovers that it has 
no good reason behind it—it is merely the result of an illusion created by language.  
While Ri’s intuitive answer does hold some promise, as it stands Rg must still be 
troubled, for it doesn’t suggest a way to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
emotional utilities other than this seemingly ad hoc method.  Rg has admitted emotional 
utilities, but now it sees that without some structured approach to evaluating the 
legitimacy of these emotional utilities, the process threatens to become an arbitrary 
mess.  What would stop Re from making the case that all emotions are irrational by 
definition, putting us back where we began with no legitimate emotional utility in the 
utility calculus?  It looks like Rg may need to accept all emotional utilities, even the 
dubious ones.  It might have to accept Frankp’s argument that once we have the brute 
fact of the emotional reaction and thus the emotional utility, the decision based upon it 
can be considered rational; the question of the grounds for the emotion is outside the 
scope of rationality, as we are treating it. 
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I offer one more example that really highlights the problem.  In it we have two 
respondents, Mindy and Cindy, each with just a one-dollar bill currently in her pocket.  
They are both offered the chance of a lifetime to pay that one dollar immediately to play 
a lottery that offers a 99% chance of winning $1 million, and a 1% chance of getting 
nothing.  Both women consider the prospect and decline to play.  As we know by now, 
we certainly should not call them irrational at this point before doing some 
investigating, attempting to expose an inner inconsistency.  When we question Mindy 
we learn that she is a “normal” person in every respect, and would welcome winning $1 
million if it cost her only a dollar.  However, the particular dollar bill in Mindy’s pocket is 
an extremely rare one that she could sell for $2 million whenever she pleases.  Suddenly 
her decision looks like a very good one—loss-aversion is not an issue, and it’s simply a 
choice for the higher utility. 
Cindy is a more curious case, however.  Cindy says she declined the lottery just 
because she “really, really likes” the particular dollar bill in her pocket.  It is not a rare 
one like Mindy’s—it is really worth only $1.  Furthermore, Cindy admits that the $1 
million is not unattractive to her.  If she played and won the $1 million, she’d be very 
happy she played.  The 1% chance that she’ll give up her dollar bill and end up with 
nothing is just too great, however, and such a loss would absolutely devastate her, so 
she is confident that passing up the lottery is the right decision for her. 
Is Rg, because it admits emotional utilities and wants to do so consistently, 
doomed to a commitment to Cindy’s rationality?  Cindy has an extremely high loss-
aversion connected with her dollar bill, which produces an extremely large negative 
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emotional utility that should factor into her decision.  Is Rg forced to say this is a rational 
decision regardless of the fact that when questioned about her special dollar bill, Cindy 
states that she just likes it and would really hate to lose it, and that she really can’t 
explain it further? 
§3. Reasons, Causes and the Next Externalist Check 
Intuitively, what distinguishes rational from irrational decisions in the examples 
above is that in the cases that seem irrational, something is lacking in the explanation 
for the decision.  Frankp’s account, and especially Cindy’s when compared to Mindy’s, do 
not represent the kind of thorough explanation we think is necessary for a decision to 
be rational.  As I have argued above, however, Rg cannot stand pat with simply asserting 
that this intuitive difference is what will determine our questions of rationality—that 
what seems rational to us is rational and what does not is not—for this would introduce 
a host of problems.  Some kind of structure and formal definitions will be necessary to 
bolster this intuition.  Recall that on the question of consistency, a temptation was to 
simply decree that rejecting the end of overall consistency is out of play.  While this 
stipulation was added to Rg in the end, it was not put there by mere decree.  Instead we 
were able to find an argument from Davidson that the stipulation was a necessary 
consequence of the fact that rationality deals with thinking, judging beings.  I think that 
with our current issue we can also do better than a mere decree. 
One possibility is that with the consistency requirement admitted, we already 
have enough at our disposal to call Frankp and Cindy irrational.  It would simply be a 
matter of probing deeply enough into their preferences and ends to expose an internal 
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inconsistency.  I think that internalists like Williams, and especially Davidson, would 
advocate this route.  If the hypothesis is true that Cindy is “normal” in all respects 
except those regarding this particular dollar bill, we can understand why the internalist 
might be confident that he can expose an inner inconsistency.  In fact, given the 
interconnectedness of propositional attitudes, the hypothesis is unrealistic, and such a 
loss-aversion would accompany other strange propositional attitudes until either there 
is a contradiction or we begin to question Cindy’s status as a thinking, judging being.  If 
we suppose for argument’s sake, however, that a probe fails to reveal that Cindy’s loss-
aversion for this dollar bill contradicts any of her other ends, I don’t think this means our 
only option is the mere decree, defining rationality so it excludes her.  There is another 
way we can focus on Cindy’s loss-aversion for the dollar bill, independent of most (if not 
all) of her other ends, and call it irrational. 
The intuitive idea of a sufficient explanation will play a central role in what I take 
to be a better solution, but I want to offer a bit from Davidson to fill out that criterion.  
In a passage reminiscent of our earlier passage about the constitution of propositional 
attitudes, Davidson states, 
In standard reason explanations…not only do the propositional contents of 
various beliefs and desires bear appropriate relations to one another and to the 
contents of the belief, attitude, or intention they help explain; the actual states 
of belief and desire cause the explained state or event.57 
 
Again we see that propositional attitudes necessarily entail logical relations to each 
other and causal relations to the world.  In a reason explanation, then, both the reason 
and cause for the event need to be present.  “In the case of irrationality, the causal 
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relation remains, while the logical relation is missing or distorted…there is a mental 
cause that is not a reason for what it causes,”58 he explains, offering what I believe is a 
crucial distinction that is the beginning of a solution to our present problem.  His 
statement that “many desires and emotions are irrational if they are explained by 
mental causes that are not reasons for them,”59 perfectly characterizes the underlying 
trouble with the explanations given by Frankp and Cindy.  They can explain what causes 
them to decide as they do, but they cannot give a good reason for that cause.  In a 
sense, both Mindy and Cindy have the same cause for their decision not to play the 
lottery—the mental event that is their desire to keep their dollar bill.  But only Mindy’s 
explanation counts as a reason explanation, for she has a cause with a good reason, 
while Cindy has merely the bare cause.   
§4. Rg:  Current State and Future 
 With our latest and final externalist check in place, I again offer Rg, in what will 
be, for us, its final form: 
A decision is right if and only if its actual outcome is at least as good as that of 
every other possible outcome. 
A decision is rational if and only if the decision maker, given ends* she has 
internalized and knows, chooses to do what, as far as she knows, she has most 
reason** to do at the point in time at which the decision is made. 
* End here is not to be construed so broadly that it could include an end to defy 
overarching consistency, or—what that amounts to—an end to be irrational.  
Such constraints of consistency and rationality are preconditions for thinking, 
judging beings, rather than ends that one can choose to adopt or reject. 
** Reason here, while it respects the internalist perspective that one must know 
about the reason to have it, is not to be construed so broadly that it includes 
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bare causes, i.e. mental events that explain how a decision is caused without 
actually being a reason for the decision. 
 
 The main text of Rg has not changed at all from the form in which we left it at the 
end of the first chapter.  As we have seen, however, the devil has been in the details of 
clarifying further how crucial words are to be read.  The first note comes from our first 
externalist check that outlawed the end to be inconsistent.  As for the second note, we 
have seen that ‘reason’ can be even more loaded than we initially assessed, as now we 
see the need for specifying that a bare cause must not be mistaken for a reason.   
 Rg stands clearly distinguished from the Re and Ri that we began with, for it has 
cast off the unrealistic rigid requirements of Re, while it has kept hope for normativity by 
staying away from the problematic extremes that Ri runs towards.  The question of 
which original notion, Re or Ri, has the most influence on Rg can be debated, I think, just 
as the sides of internalism and externalism debate each other when they modify their 
stances to accommodate intuitions.  Externalists may claim that by incorporating my 
externalist checks I have given the deciding nod to them.  We find Hollis making a similar 
claim when addressing the question of how, on the internal reasons account, desires 
that are not immediate can possibly override immediate desires.  He examines Williams’ 
answer, his definition of the self as “a construct marked by a project,”60 and points out 
that this project must be sufficiently rigid, lest it be subject to the whims of immediate 
desire and thus no help at all.  The more rigid it is, however, the more “the shape of this 
overarching project…sounds uncommonly like the guidance of external reasons.”61 





 Just as Hollis concludes that “the idea of a grand project gives the game to the 
external reasons theorist,”62 he might argue that my stipulations added to Rg have given 
the game to Re.  Rg is the same in spirit as Re, he might say.  It is only a minor difference 
that Rg insists we consider more complex utilities, and Re can readily do that. 
 We should note at this point, then, that for what it is worth, we might have the 
same end results for Rg without the stipulations being stated explicitly.  This seems clear 
at least for the second stipulation, for as I mentioned above, the internalist might be 
able to resolve all actual problem cases by finding an inner inconsistency.  For the cases 
of Frankp and Cindy, for example, if we can assert that all thinking judging beings 
necessarily have the end to “make decisions for good reasons,” that might be all the 
internalist needs—Frank and Cindy seem to be at least somewhat aware that they are 
violating that end.  The problem with this is that it assumes an understanding of “good 
reason” which relies on the reason-cause distinction, which is precisely the distinction 
my explicit stipulation attempts to draw.   
 Is my explicit addition of the reason-cause distinction necessary, then?  Does the 
answer to this question determine whether external or internal reasons wins the day?  
Luckily I think this question matters only to those who have a vested interest in the 
internal-external reasons fight, and I do not.  As far as I am concerned, adding these 
explicit stipulations makes Rg much more ready for real use, and it bothers me little if 
the theoretical debate has not been settled.  I thank the internal-external reasons 
debate for modeling for me how each side can attempt to account in its own terms for 
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intuitively attractive features of the other side, as well as how the most sensible and 
viable answer lies in the middle.     
 I say that Rg is more ready for real use now that my stipulations have been 
added, but clearly there is a mountain of work to be done before Rg can reach its full 
potential in applicability.  Much of that work will be in the fields of behavioral 
economics and psychology, for if an accurate utility calculus requires that emotional 
utilities be incorporated, as I have argued, then it is clearly important that we learn 
more about these utilities through the experiments of behavioral economists and 
psychologists. Empirical studies will need to be done to quantify emotional utilities.  The 
mug example we examined in Case 2, where the endowment effect’s strength was 
suggested by the dollar value differences between the owned mug and the not-owned 
mug, offers a good model of the kind of experiment that might quantify emotional 
utility.  I imagine that more experiments where the threshold is sought—the point at 
which the person decides he should discard the emotional attachment and accept the 
surprisingly large sum of money for the mug (and perhaps marvel that the previous, also 
large, offer was not enough to pry the mug away from him)—would do much to put 
loss-aversion in quantifiable units.   
 Another type of experiment that could quantify loss-aversion due to framing 
effects would be similar to the lottery choice in Case 3, except it would seek to find the 
robustness of this effect.  The example in Case 3 offered equivalent options and loss-
aversion produced inconsistent preferences, but I imagine that loss-aversion is often 
robust enough that people will often choose the option phrased in non-loss-language 
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over a superior option that happens to be phrased in loss-language.  Again, finding the 
threshold, exactly how inferior an option can be before even a framing advantage 
cannot make people choose it, would help us in quantifying loss-aversion, and thus 
emotional utilities.  
 It may also be apparent by now that not only will such experiments offer 
guidance on how to quantify emotional utilities, but they can also help define a baseline 
amount of loss-aversion—the “normal” amount.  This will be crucial information 
because what’s irrational will, in part, be an empirical question.  There will be the theory 
of Rg to help us know, but we will also need to heed the empirical clues we can gather.  
The question of how far one can deviate from normal emotional utilities and still be 
considered rational will need to be addressed, and we cannot do so without some idea 
of what the normal amount is.   
 Finally, two more empirical matters that also need to be addressed are how and 
in what quantities loss-aversion is advantageous over a lifetime.  In Chapter 2, I 
suggested one of the main justifications for the rationality of the loss-averse reaction is 
that it may prove to have long-term benefits, hypothesizing that if the behavior evolved 
in us in the first place, it must have been advantageous in the past.  Investigating the 
advantages of loss-aversion over a lifetime in today’s world is certainly a tall task that 
would probably necessitate many long-term, complex studies.   I can only offer as 
consolation that at least I am offering plenty of work to keep researchers busy. 
 There is also important philosophical work to be done for Rg which, compared to 
the empirical work I have just suggested, looks entirely manageable (though obviously I 
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did not deem it so here).  What I have offered so far is a philosophical answer about 
loss-aversion.  According to what I have argued, loss-aversion in itself is not irrational, 
first because that would not respect the epistemic point I have made about irrational 
decision entailing a knowledge in the decision-maker that the decision is wrong.  There 
are certainly cases where a person is unaware that their loss-aversion is leading them to 
the wrong decision, and these are different from truly irrational decisions.  Even if one is 
aware that loss-aversion is leading him to make a decision that on some accounts might 
be called inconsistent, however, we have seen with the admission of emotional utilities 
that the loss-aversion still may be leading him to the correct decision.  In cases like these 
where the loss-aversion is justified, or there is good reason for the loss-averse reaction, 
the loss-averse decision is not irrational.  In fact the opposing decision, which would 
disregard the loss-averse reaction as automatically unfounded and illegitimate, would 
be at least a mistaken decision made upon an unsophisticated and mistaken rational 
choice theory, if not an irrational decision. 
 I have also argued, however, that loss-aversion still has the potential to lead to 
irrational decisions in many cases, namely ones where the agent sees that the loss-
averse reaction is groundless—is merely a mental cause rather than a cause cum 
reason—yet persists in the loss-averse behavior.  I’ve offered the beginnings of a theory 
that can help answer the crucial question of when loss-aversion is justified and when it 
is not:  the reason-cause distinction.  But as it is this idea is not ready for use; it is just 
the rudiments of a structure.  A large remaining philosophical task, then, is filling out the 
details of this distinction in a way that is relevant to rational choice theory.  For 
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example, some characteristics of the typical cause cum reason might be offered 
alongside some characteristics of the typical bare cause.   
 I believe there will always be some problem cases, some gray areas regarding a 
possible reason-cause schism.  It will be debatable sometimes whether an emotional 
utility is just a bare cause or whether it has at least a weak reason attached, and I don’t 
think any philosophical reason-cause theory, no matter how filled-out it is, will be able 
to give a definitive answer for every case.   This is why, as I mentioned above, we will 
need empirical clues:  an emotional utility that looks outlandish compared to the norm 
is more likely to be a bare cause.  Nevertheless, a philosophical reason-cause distinction 
filled out to the best of our ability will still be a valuable tool in answering questions of 
rationality, and it represents a definite improvement over the intuitive approach of 
calling some explanations good and others bad. 
 Overall, then, the future work I am suggesting necessarily involves much 
interaction between the empirical and philosophical.  The empirical will need guidance 
from the philosophical to avoid calling the behavior it observes rational simply by virtue 
of its being normal human behavior.  The philosophical will need guidance from the 
empirical to prevent it from overstepping its bounds and defining a rationality before it 
is even clear what rationality should be.  I see this interaction as the way in which 
society as a whole moves towards a better definition of what is rational. 
§5. Self-Knowledge and the Individual’s Quest for Rationality 
I argued early on that a decision should be called irrational only if we know that 
the agent knows in some capacity that the decision he is making is wrong.  This 
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epistemic point has remained mostly in the background throughout our case studies, 
however.  Certainly I have offered plenty of reminders that by my account, this 
knowledge is necessary if a decision is to be properly called irrational.  The point also 
saw a slight improvement when, in light of the discussion of consistency, I could modify 
the issue from the agent “being aware that he’s wrong” to “being aware of the inner 
inconsistency.”  My main focus in the case studies, though, was whether things were 
even potentially irrational.  I asked if it is even potentially irrational to have inner 
inconsistency, because one might reject the end of inner consistency.  I also asked if it is 
even potentially irrational to make a decision based on emotional utilities, especially if 
we establish legitimacy for emotional utilities.  If, despite these questions, the potential 
irrationality was established, then actual irrationality was a mere matter of the agent 
becoming aware of the problem and refusing to adjust accordingly.   
As this study comes to a close, however, I think it is important to revisit this 
epistemic point, and explain why I felt it necessary to constantly remind my readers that 
inconsistency needs to be recognized as such for a case of true irrationality to occur.  In 
short, it is because my conception of the individual’s quest for rationality needs it.  I 
begin my conception with an idea from Davidson (which he says he borrows from 
Freud), the idea of semi-independent structures in the mind.  “If parts of the mind are to 
some degree independent, we can understand how they are able to harbour 
inconsistencies, and to interact on a causal level,”63 he states, and makes it clear that 
such a hypothesis is necessary if we are to make sense of irrationality.  Davidson cannot 
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conceive of how a person can actually believe “p and not-p,” yet this is what every 
internal inconsistency reduces to.  If “p” and “not-p” are harbored in different parts of 
the mind, however, he can understand how they can coexist.64 
Up to this point, I like Davidson’s explanation and the spatial metaphor it 
suggests, where contradictory beliefs are kept a safe distance from each other.  He 
often suggests that the mere coexistence of contradictory beliefs can be called 
irrationality, however:  “If someone has inconsistent beliefs or attitudes, as I have 
claimed (objective) irrationality demands, then he must at times believe some 
proposition p and also believe its negation.”65  Granted Davidson does not state that this 
is sufficient for irrationality, but I am also unable to find him specifying, as I do, that the 
agent’s awareness of the inconsistency is also necessary.  
I think that Davidson’s way of speaking makes rationality too strict, as even the 
most obscure contradictions would be irrationalities.  This hearkens back to my 
argument for making the epistemic point in the first place:  without it, many decisions 
that are just ‘wrong’ become ‘irrational.’66  Davidson states, “In the possible case, of 
simultaneously, and in some sense actively, believing contradictory propositions, the 
thinker fails to put two and two (or one and one) together.”67  To be sure, it is not 
incongruous to call the failure to put two and two together irrational, but would we 
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67 Davidson 198. 
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want to say the same about, say, failing to take 54 to the 17th power?  The answer is just 
as certain, if not as accessible, as putting two and two together, and technically if we are 
to call a failure to do the addition irrational, we must also call the failure to 
exponentiate irrational.  This point is most demonstrable in framing examples.  The 
example we studied in Case 3 was relatively transparent, but we could lure Frank into 
the exact same inconsistency by way of a much more complicated formulation.68  Rather 
than try to draw a line between easy operations that should be done, and difficult ones 
for which he have an excuse, I think it is much more natural to simply require awareness 
of an inconsistency before we have irrationality—until then it is only potential.     
This distinction upon which I insist, the epistemic point, allows us to truly 
appreciate the dynamism of the individual’s quest for rationality.  By my conception, she 
is rarely, if ever, at full-blown irrationality, and the same holds for rationality.  The more 
self-reflective she is, however, the more often she will be forced to adjust her 
propositional attitudes.  For it is self-reflection that puts p and not-p on the collision 
course, and if she wants to avoid the fiery crash of irrationality she must either adjust 
(by rejecting either p or not-p) or stop the process of self-reflection. 
Here I should admit that on my account, one who never engages in self-
reflection and thus can never become aware of inner inconsistencies is in no danger of 
irrationality.  This is hardly an endorsement of the one who refuses to reflect, however.  
                                                             
68 See Tversky and Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,” Choices, Values, and 
Frames, ed. Kahneman and Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 213, for a good 
example of a choice between two fairly complex lotteries.  The respondents consistently choose the 
lottery of lower expected value, and it is understandable because given the complexity, they have little to 
go on for their decision other than the inferior lottery being phrased in more favorable terms. 
75 
 
While it is true that technically I don’t call her irrational, this certainly does not mean 
she is better than the self-reflector who occasionally lapses into irrationality.  Her 
absolute refusal to reflect on any of her propositional attitudes (if she can have any) 
makes her more like Joe from Case 1, for it causes her to be a stranger to the house of 
reason.  As implied, I do think most if not all human beings do engage in this self-
reflection.  It is a good thing, because by my account it is only by this process of self-
reflection and averting the collisions of irrationality—this hurtling oneself towards 
irrationality so that he can weed it out—that the individual can move towards 
rationality.  
On the larger, societal scale, the same process is mirrored.  Society cannot simply 
theorize its way to rationality.  Like the individual, it needs to reflect on itself, in this 
case in the form of empirical studies, so that it can see what should be held as rational.  
Where the theory and empirical data conflict, an adjustment must be made to avoid the 
crash of irrationality.  This characterizes the process for judging the legitimacy of 
emotional utilities, as well as the process for defining reason-cause criteria.   
Finally, the individual cannot engage in his own quest without society also 
engaging in its quest.  The individual often needs to defer to what society tells him 
about human beings for help in determining whether he has exposed an inner 
contradiction, and whether he might be acting on a mental cause without a reason.   
I am just touching on what is probably becoming increasingly apparent:  a 
complex network of dynamic processes that together, in time, can determine a better 
and more correct notion of rationality.  I hope that what I have done here has at least 
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drawn attention to some serious problems with current conceptions of rationality, and 
offered a way to begin understanding a global rationality.  In response to the question, 
“Are people rational?” Kahneman suggests that “the time has perhaps come to set aside 
the overly general question,”69  and this seems especially wise in light of all I have 
argued.  If one insists upon asking the question still, however, I reply that it takes a 
mistaken notion of rationality to even venture an answer to the ill-formed question.  By 
one notion, which imposes a rigid theory of rationality in spite of rationality not being 
fully understood, people are often irrational—in fact so often that one might begin to 
wonder why we should want to be rational.  By another notion, people are almost 
always rational, in an almost trivial way.  It defers to our ignorance about rationality and 
insists that “there must be some reason, even if we don’t understand it.”  But if 
rationality is to be properly understood (or if we are to begin to properly understand 
rationality) we need to ask whether people move towards rationality.  I hope I have 
shown to that question we can answer that if we are engaging in a process whereby we 
are trying to make better decisions and improve the way we get through life; if we are 
holding ourselves to some inflexible standards of consistency while also recognizing that 
we need to learn more about ourselves, because there might be more to us than we 
understand; if we are admitting that there can be reasons for our decisions that we do 
not fully understand, without resigning ourselves to a metaphysical truth that there are 
always reasons for our decisions which we will never understand, then we are engaging 
in, or chasing after, rationality.   
                                                             
69 Kahneman, “New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption,” Choices, Values, and Frames, ed. 
Kahneman and Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 774. 
